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Whither the Functional Parent?
REVISITING EQUITABLE PARENTHOOD
DOCTRINES IN LIGHT OF SAME-SEX PARENTS’
INCREASED ACCESS TO OBTAINING FORMAL
LEGAL PARENT STATUS
Jessica Feinberg†
INTRODUCTION
Until relatively recently, the law did not provide avenues
through which both members of a same-sex couple could gain
recognition as the parents of the children they were raising
together. Instead, generally only the member of the same-sex
couple who was the child’s biological parent was recognized as
the child’s legal parent, and the nonbiological parent was
considered a legal stranger to the child.1 Historically,
nonbiological parents in same-sex relationships could not gain
legal parent status because the traditional avenues for
establishing legal parent status in the United States have been
based upon biology, marriage, and adoption.2 Since joint
biological parenthood was not an option for same-sex couples
and for most of the nation’s history members of same-sex couples
could not marry each other or adopt each other’s legal children,
the traditional avenues for establishing legal parent status
excluded nonbiological parents raising children in same-sex
relationships.3 As a result, if upon the dissolution of the
† Associate Professor, Mercer University School of Law. I am extremely
grateful to Susan Frelich Appleton for providing essential feedback on an earlier draft of
this article. Thank you also to Libby Adler, Aníbal Rosario Lebrón, and the participants
in the Feminist Legal Theory Collaborative Research Network Program at the 2017 Law
and Society Conference for providing insightful suggestions and comments. Chantal
Peacock and Rebekah Hogg provided invaluable research assistance throughout the
drafting process. Finally, thank you to LBF, ABF, and RBF for your unwavering love
and support.
1 Jessica Feinberg, Consideration of Genetic Connections in Child Custody
Disputes Between Same-Sex Parents: Fair or Foul?, 81 MO. L. REV. 331, 334, 348 (2016).
2 Pamela Laufer-Ukeles & Ayelet Blecher-Prigat, Between Function and
Form: Towards a Differentiated Model of Functional Parenthood, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV.
419, 428 (2013).
3 See infra notes 22–26 and accompanying text.
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relationship between the “formal legal parent”4 and the
nonbiological parent, the formal legal parent restricted or
terminated the nonbiological parent’s access to the child, the
nonbiological parent generally was left without legal recourse.5
In such situations, courts usually denied nonbiological parents
any rights to custody or visitation, which effectively ended the
relationship between a child and an individual who had
functioned, oftentimes since birth, as the child’s parent.6
In an effort to avoid the harsh results stemming from the
application of the traditional avenues of establishing legal
parent status to nonbiological parents raising children in samesex relationships, a number of courts and legislatures adopted
doctrines to grant visitation or custody rights under certain
circumstances to individuals who had functioned as a child’s
parent, but who were unable to attain formal legal parent status
under existing law.7 Common titles for such doctrines include
“de facto parentage, psychological parent, in loco parentis, [and]
parent by estoppel.”8 While the doctrines differ by jurisdiction, they
commonly provide visitation- or custody-related rights to
individuals who, with the legal parent’s consent or encouragement,
have lived with the child and have functioned as the child’s parent
by forming a parent-like bond with the child and assuming the
obligations of parenthood.9 This article will refer to such
doctrines collectively as “equitable parenthood doctrines.”
Over the years, at least eighteen states have adopted
equitable parenthood doctrines that grant child custody or
visitation rights in certain circumstances to individuals who are
not formal legal parents, but who have functioned in a parental
role to a child (functional parents).10 Proponents of equitable
parenthood doctrines stress the essential role that such
doctrines play in promoting the well-being and best interests of
4 For purposes of this article, the term “formal legal parent” will refer to
individuals the law concludes or presumes are legal parents as a result of status-based
indicators such as, for example, biology, marriage, and adoption.
5 Feinberg, supra note 1, at 348.
6 Id.
7 See infra Section I.B.1.
8 Joanna L. Grossman, The New Illegitimacy: Tying Parentage to Marital
Status for Lesbian Co-Parents, 20 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 671, 677 (2012); see
also Laufer-Ukeles & Blecher-Prigat supra note 2, at 446 (“Thus, although achieving
functional parental status requires meeting a significant set of criteria, once the
conditions are met, many jurisdictions treat functional parental figures as replacements
for and equivalent to formal parents.”).
9 See infra notes 83–85 and accompanying text.
10 Steven W. Fitschen & Eric A. DeGroff, Is it Time for the Court to Accept the
O.F.F.E.R.?: Applying Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform
to Promote Clarity, Consistency, and Federalism in the World of De Facto Parenthood, 24
S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 419, 427 (2015).
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children, who may suffer significant short- and long-term harm
when the relationship they share with an individual whom they
view as a parent is severed.11 Proponents also stress the strict
requirements that must be satisfied in order for an individual to
qualify under these doctrines, which generally limit application
of the doctrine to truly compelling cases involving individuals
who have functioned, with the formal legal parent’s consent, as
a parent to the child.12 Conversely, opponents of equitable
parenthood doctrines maintain that the standards employed in
such doctrines are complicated, non-objective, fact-intensive and
lead to unpredictable results, and claim that the adoption of
such doctrines results in litigation that is costly, lengthy, and
contentious.13 Other opponents have stressed the belief that by
granting functional parents custody and visitation rights over
the wishes of formal legal parents, the doctrines infringe on legal
parents’ fundamental rights to direct the care, custody, and
control of their children.14 Despite the differing views regarding
equitable parenthood doctrines, the number of jurisdictions that
have adopted such doctrines that provide visitation- or custodyrelated rights to functional parents in same-sex relationships
has increased significantly over the past thirty or so years.15
Recent developments in laws governing same-sex
parentage, however, have created new questions regarding the
future of equitable parenthood doctrines. More specifically, as a
result of the nationwide legalization of same-sex marriage in
2015 and the increasing number of jurisdictions recognizing
second parent adoption in recent years, a growing number of
marriage- and adoption-based avenues to establishing formal
legal parent status are now available to nonbiological parents
raising children within same-sex relationships.16 Due to the fact
that it was, in significant part, the historical denial of avenues to
establishing formal legal parent status for nonbiological parents
raising children within same-sex relationships that led many
courts and legislatures to adopt equitable parenthood doctrines,
these same entities may conclude that now that such parents
have access to formal avenues to establishing legal parent status,
equity no longer requires application or adoption of equitable
parenthood doctrines. In fact, in cases involving same-sex parents,
several courts have already cited as a justification for declining to
11
12
13
14
15
16

See infra notes 53–71 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 112–115 and accompanying text.
See infra note 118 and accompanying text.
See infra note 117 and accompanying text.
See infra note 84 and accompanying text.
See infra Section II.A.

58

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83:1

adopt or apply equitable parenthood doctrines the availability of a
formal avenue through which the individual seeking parental
rights could have established legal parent status.17
This article argues that courts and legislatures should
continue to adopt and apply equitable parenthood doctrines,
despite the increasing availability to nonbiological parents raising
children within same-sex relationships of formal avenues to
establishing legal parent status. As an initial matter, the current
avenues to establishing formal legal parent status for nonbiological
parents raising children within same-sex relationships generally
require marriage, adoption, or both.18 Importantly, there are many
reasons for why same-sex parents may not pursue these
marriage- or adoption-based avenues that are completely
unrelated to the relationship between the parents or between
the parents and their children. Moreover, excluding equitable
parenthood doctrines due to the availability to same-sex couples
of marriage- or adoption-based avenues for establishing legal
parent status would further exacerbate the law’s discriminatory
treatment of same-sex parents and disproportionately harm
same-sex couples and their children. This is because, unlike
same-sex couples, different-sex couples raising children have
access to a variety of avenues to establishing legal parent status
that require neither marriage nor adoption.19 Moreover, even if
in the future same-sex parents receive greater access to the
formal avenues of establishing legal parent status available to
different-sex parents, equitable parenthood doctrines will still
serve an important function. There will always be couples who,
despite jointly raising their children, are unable or unwilling for
various reasons to take the steps necessary to establish formal
17 A.H. v. M.P., 857 N.E.2d 1061, 1065, 1073–74 (Mass. 2006) (refusing to apply
an equitable parenthood doctrine despite the fact that the plaintiff had planned with the
defendant for the child’s birth, attended prenatal activities, helped care for the child for
the first year and a half of the child’s life, and was referred to as “Mama” by the child,
and stating that “[i]n this jurisdiction, same-sex couples, like heterosexual couples, are
free to adopt the children of their partners”); Debra H. v. Janice R., 930 N.E.2d 184, 189,
194 (N.Y. 2010) (refusing to apply an equitable parenthood doctrine despite the fact that the
plaintiff served as a loving and caring parental figure during the first two and a half years of
the child’s life and stating that “the right of second-parent adoption . . . furnishes the
biological and adoptive parents of children—and, importantly, those children themselves—
with a simple and understandable rule by which to guide their relationships and order their
lives”), abrogated by Brooke S.B. v. Elizabeth A.C.C., 61 N.E.3d 488 (N.Y. 2016); Titchenal v.
Dexter, 693 A.2d 682, 683–87 (Vt. 1997) (refusing to apply an equitable parenthood
doctrine despite the fact that the plaintiff had held herself out as the child’s parent and
had provided the majority of care for the child from the time of the child’s birth until the
child was three and a half years old, and explaining that nonbiological parents in samesex relationships have the ability to protect their interests through adoption).
18 See infra Section II.A.
19 See infra Section II.B.1.
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legal parent status for the functional parent, and it is both unfair
and unwise to punish children so harshly for the actions of their
parents. A legal approach that categorically refuses to provide
rights to functional parents is an approach that fails to promote one
of family law’s most essential goals: protecting the best of interests
of children.
The article is organized in the following manner: Part I
provides a historical overview of the legal treatment of same-sex
parents raising children together and traces the development of
equitable parenthood doctrines. Part II identifies and examines
the avenues to establishing formal legal parent status that have
been extended to same-sex couples in recent years as well as
those avenues available to different-sex couples that have not
yet been extended to same-sex couples. Part III evaluates
whether under current law governing the recognition of parentchild relationships there is a continuing need for equitable
parenthood doctrines, and argues that there are compelling
reasons for legislatures and courts to continue to adopt and
apply equitable parenthood doctrines despite the recent
expansion to same-sex couples of various avenues to establishing
formal legal parent status. Part IV first evaluates whether
recognition of equitable parenthood doctrines will be necessary
if, in the future, same-sex parents gain greater access to the
formal avenues to establishing legal parent status enjoyed by
different-sex parents. After answering this question in the
affirmative, Part IV concludes by exploring the role that the
LGBT rights movement should play with regard to the
maintenance and promotion of equitable parenthood doctrines.
I.

THE LAW’S TREATMENT OF SAME-SEX PARENTS AND THE
DEVELOPMENT OF EQUITABLE PARENTHOOD DOCTRINES

A.

The Troubled History of the Legal Treatment of SameSex Parents and the Need for Equitable Parenthood
Doctrines

Historically, the primary bases for bestowing upon an
individual the status of legal parent have included “biology,
adoption, [and] marriage.”20 As a result, the laws governing the
granting of legal parent status had harsh results for same-sex
couples raising children, leaving such couples without the ability
to establish both members as the legal parents of the children

20

Laufer-Ukeles & Blecher-Prigat, supra note 2, at 428.
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they were raising.21 With regard to biology as a basis for
bestowing legal parent status, it has functioned by providing
legal parent status for women based upon giving birth and for
men based upon genetic fatherhood.22 Since in female same-sex
couples only one member can give birth to the child and in male
same-sex couples only one member can be the child’s genetic father,
generally biology only has provided the basis for granting legal
parent status to one member of a same-sex couple.23 With regard to
marriage as a basis for providing legal parent status, under the
longstanding marital presumption of paternity, the law presumes
that the husband of a woman who conceives or gives birth to a child
during the marriage is the legal father of the child.24 The historical
exclusion of same-sex couples from the institution of marriage
meant that same-sex couples could not establish legal parent
status through marriage-based parentage laws.25 Finally, with
regard to adoption as a basis for providing legal parenthood, for
most of the nation’s history adoption laws across the country did
not allow an individual to adopt the legal child of his or her
nonmarital partner (thereby excluding same-sex couples who, until
recently, were excluded from the institution of marriage) and did
not allow for joint adoption by same-sex partners.26
Taken together, the historical legal landscape governing
the bases for establishing legal parenthood frequently left samesex couples raising children in the difficult situation wherein
only one member of the couple, the member who was the
biological or adoptive parent of the child, formally was
recognized as the child’s legal parent. In situations in which the
parents’ relationship dissolved and the formal legal parent
restricted or terminated the functional parent’s access to the
child, the functional parent was often viewed by the court as a
legal stranger and denied standing to seek child custody or
visitation.27 Many of these cases involved denying any rights to
See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
Feinberg, supra note 1, at 340.
23 Id. at 348.
24 Id. at 340–41.
25 The first state to legalize same-sex marriage was Massachusetts, which did so
in 2003. Same-Sex Marriage, State by State, PEW RES. CTR. (June 26, 2015), http://www.
pewforum.org/2015/06/26/same-sex-marriage-state-by-state/ [https://perma.cc/5FWF-FFLC].
26 Timeline & Victories, NAT’L CTR. FOR LESBIAN RIGHTS, http://www.
nclrights.org/about-us/mission-history/timeline-of-victories/ [https://perma.cc/W68CCQDF] (“1986—NCLR represents Annie Affleck and Rebecca Smith as they become
one of the first same-sex couples to jointly adopt in the U.S. 1987—NCLR wins one of
the first second-parent adoption cases in the country and begins promoting secondparent adoption as a legal strategy for protecting same-sex parent families”).
27 Feinberg, supra note 1, at 348; Courtney G. Joslin, Leaving No (Nonmarital)
Child Behind, 48 FAM. L.Q. 495, 497–98 (2014).
21

22

2017]

WHITHER THE FUNCTIONAL PARENT

61

maintain contact with the child to individuals who had planned for
the child, functioned as the child’s parent from the time of the
child’s birth, and/or formed incredibly strong bonds with the child.28
As societal acceptance of same-sex relationships grew
over the years, the number of same-sex couples raising children
increased and cases involving the custody of their children
became more frequent. Leading LGBT rights organizations such
as the National Center for Lesbian Rights (NCLR), Lambda
Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc. (Lambda Legal), and
Gay & Lesbian Advocates & Defenders (GLAD),29 consistently
played important roles in these cases, representing functional
parents or submitting amicus briefs on behalf of functional
parents.30 In case after case over the years, these leading LGBT
28 Feinberg, supra note 1, at 348; Joslin, supra note 27, at 498 (“As a result,
hundreds, if not thousands, of children were abruptly cut off from one of the only parents
they ever knew.”).
29 In February of 2016, the organization changed its name to GLBTQ Legal
Advocates & Defenders. Janson Wu, The Generations of a Name, GLAD (Feb. 23, 2016),
http://www.glad.org/post/the-generations-of-a-name [https://perma.cc/N6PB-FLUU].
30 See, e.g., Reply Brief of Petitioner A.B., In re Visitation with C.B.L., 723
N.E.2d 316 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999) (No. 1-98-2011), 1999 WL 33741226; Brief of Amicus
Curiae Lambda Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., In re Parentage of A.B., 837 N.E.2d
965, (Ind. 2005) (No. 53S01-0511-JV-606, http://www.lambdalegal.org/sites/default/files/
legal-docs/downloads/in-re-parentage-of-ab_in_20050112_amicus-lambda-lagal.pdf
[https://perma.cc/D8HL-SYLZ] (in support of the petitioner); Brief of Amici Curiae Am.
Civil Liberties Union et al., in Support of Plaintiff-Appellee, Frazier v. Goudschaal, 295
P.3d 542 (Kan. 2013) (No. 103,487), 2010 WL 3406616; Brief of Appellee C.E.W., C.E.W.
v. D.E.W., 845 A.2d 1146 (Me. 2004) (No. CUM-02-534), 2002 WL 32949146 (in support
of the petitioner); Brief of Amicus Curiae Lambda Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc.,
Conover v. Conover, 141 A.3d 31 (Md. 2016) (No. 79), https://freestate-justice.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/02/Conover-2016.02.25-Amicus-Brief-of-Lambda-Legal.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9NF5-2B6M] (in support of the petitioner); Brief of Amicus Curiae
Nat’l Ctr. for Lesbian Rights et al., Janice M. v. Margaret K., 948 A.2d 73 (Md. 2008)
(No. 122), 2007 WL 1336442 (in support of the respondent/cross-petitioner); Appellants’
Brief, White v. White, 293 S.W.3d 1 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009) (No. WD69580), 2008 WL
4143932; Brief of Amicus Curiae Nat’l Ctr. for Lesbian Rights in Support of PlaintiffAppellant, Latham v. Schwerdtfeger, 802 N.W.2d 66 (Neb. Ct. App. 2011) (No. S-10-742),
2010 WL 4892503; Brief of Amici Curiae Nat’l Ctr. for Lesbian Rights et al., Debra H. v.
Janice R., 930 N.E.2d 184 (N.Y. 2010) (No. 106569/08), http://www.lambdalegal.org/incourt/legal-docs/debra-h_ny_20100504_lgbt-groups-amicus [https://perma.cc/WYS6-D88L]
(in support of petitioner); Brief of Amicus Curiae Nat’l Ctr. of Lesbian Rights in Support
of Appellant Michele Hobbs, In re Mullen, 953 N.E.2d 302 (Ohio 2011) (No. 2010-02676),
2010 WL 9012297; Brief of Amicus Curiae Lambda Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc. et al.,
on Behalf of Appellants, In re Bonfield, 780 N.E.2d 241 (Ohio 2002) (No. 2001-0625),
2001 WL 34555949; Brief for Appellant, T.B. v. L.R.M., 874 A.2d 34 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005)
(No. 1241 WDA 2004), 2004 WL 3317890; Brief of Amici Curiae Gay & Lesbian Advocates
& Defenders et al., Rubano v. DiCenzo, 759 A.2d 959 (R.I. 2000) (No. 97-604-A), 1997
WL 33808968 (in support of the petitioner); Amicus Brief of Lesbian & Gay Rights Project
of the Am. Civil Liberties Union et al., In re Parentage of L.B., 122 P.3d 161 (Wash. 2005)
(No. 75626–1), 2003 WL 23875746 (in support of the petitioner); Amici Curiae Brief of Nat’l
Ctr. for Lesbian Rights et al., In re Parentage of L.B., 122 P.3d 161 (Wash. 2005) (Nos.
75626-1 & 52151-9-1), 2005 WL 723841 (in support of the appellant/respondent); Brief of
Amicus Curiae Nat’l Ctr. of Lesbian Rights, Sinnott v. Peck, No. 2015-426 (Vt. Argued
May 24, 2016) (No. 2015-426), 2015 WL 10007643; Amicus Brief of Nat’l Ctr. for Lesbian
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rights organizations argued forcefully for the application of
equitable parenthood doctrines to protect the rights and wellbeing of children and their functional parents,31 and the
arguments in favor of protecting the relationships between
children and their functional parents have garnered substantial
success.32 Troubled by the prospect of completely severing the
relationship between a child and an adult who had functioned as
the child’s parent, courts and legislatures in some jurisdictions
began to adopt equitable parenthood doctrines to grant custodyand visitation-related parental rights to individuals who had
functioned as parents but who lacked legal parent status.33
In its influential 1995 decision In re Custody of H.S.H.K.,34 the Wisconsin Supreme Court rendered one of the earliest
decisions granting custody or visitation rights to a functional
same-sex parent35 and established what has since become the most
widely adopted test for determining whether an individual
qualifies for relief under states’ equitable parenthood doctrines.36
The case involved a same-sex couple, Ms. Knott and Ms. Holtzman,
who together planned for the conception of their child via donor
insemination of Ms. Knott.37 The couple “attended obstetrical visits
and childbirth classes together[,] . . . , [and] [Ms.] Holtzman was
present during labor and delivery.”38 The child was given a last
name that combined Ms. Holtzman and Ms. Knott’s last names.39
Following the child’s birth, “[Ms.] Holtzman provided the
primary financial support for [Ms.] Knott, herself and the child
and both women shared child-care responsibilities.”40 The couple
had co-parented the child together in this manner for four years by
the time their relationship ended.41 Approximately eight months
after the couple’s relationship ended, Ms. Knott cut off all contact
Rights, In re Custody of H.S.H-K, 533 N.W.2d 419 (Wis. 1995) (No. 1993AP2911), 1994
WL 17084701 (in support of the petitioner).
31 See supra note 30 (compiling briefs from leading LGBT rights organizations
arguing in favor of the application of equitable parenthood doctrines).
32 See infra Section I.B.1.
33 Rebecca Aviel, A New Formalism for Family Law, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV.
2003, 2053 (2014) (“To avoid the kind of injustices described above and the manifest
harm to the children involved, courts have been increasingly responsive to claims that
someone who has functioned as a parent should have some legally protectable rights that
overcome the objection of the legal parent, even when the statutory scheme makes no
such provision.”).
34 In re Custody of H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d 419 (Wis. 1995).
35 Kimberly D. Richman, (When) Are Rights Wrong? Rights Discourses and
Indeterminacy in Gay and Lesbian Parents’ Custody Cases, 30 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 137, 151 (2005).
36 Grossman, supra note 8, at 677–79.
37 In re Custody of H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d at 421.
38 Id.
39 Id. at 422.
40 Id.
41 Id. at 421–22.
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between Ms. Holtzman and the child, and Ms. Holtzman
subsequently filed for custody and visitation.42
Although the guardian ad litem reported to the trial court
that the child believed Ms. Holtzman was his parent and wished
to spend time with her, and the court found that Ms. Holtzman
had “devoted herself to the child,”43 it nonetheless reluctantly
granted summary judgment in favor of Ms. Knott.44 The trial
court explained that the relevant custody and visitation laws did
not recognize the relationship “between a child and a parent’s
nontraditional partner.”45 The trial court stressed that by ignoring
the trauma experienced by children upon the termination of their
relationship with a parent-like figure, the law failed to promote the
best interests of children.46 The trial court urged the legislature “to
reexamine the law in light of the realities of modern society.”47
On appeal, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that despite
the fact that none of the existing child custody or visitation statutes
directly applied to Ms. Holtzman’s situation, the court nonetheless
had equitable power to hear her claim for visitation if she could
prove that she shares a “parent-like relationship with the child and
that a significant triggering event justifies state intervention in the
child’s relationship with a biological or adoptive parent.”48 The
court developed a multipart test to determine whether it was
within the court’s equitable power to hear a petition for visitation.49
The first part of the test requires the petitioner to prove each of the
following four elements:
(1) that the biological or adoptive parent consented to, and fostered, the
petitioner’s formation and establishment of a parent-like relationship with
the child; (2) that the petitioner and the child lived together in the same
household; (3) that the petitioner assumed obligations of parenthood by
taking significant responsibility for the child’s care, education and
development, including contributing towards the child’s support, without
expectation of financial compensation; and (4) that the petitioner has been
in a parental role for a length of time sufficient to have established with the
child a bonded, dependent relationship parental in nature.50

The second part of the test requires the petitioner to
demonstrate that a “triggering event” has occurred that
“justif[ies] state intervention in the child’s relationship with a
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50

Id. at 422.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 421.
Id.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
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biological or adoptive parent” by proving that the legal parent
“interfered substantially with the petitioner’s parent-like relationship
with the child, and that the petitioner sought court ordered visitation
within a reasonable time after the parent’s interference.”51 If the
petitioner is able to satisfy the test, the petitioner has standing to seek
visitation, which the court will award if it determines that such
visitation is in the best interests of the child.52
Although its decision in In re Custody of H.S.H.-K. played
an essential role in the development of equitable parenthood
doctrines, the Wisconsin Supreme Court was far from the first
entity to recognize the importance of relationships between
children and individuals who function as their parents. In their
1973 book Beyond the Best Interests of the Child, which focused
on child placement, child psychoanalysts Anna Freud, Joseph
Goldstein, and Albert Solnit set forth the psychological parent
concept.53 As set forth, this concept emphasized the importance
of maintaining continuity in the relationship between a child
and a person who had developed a psychological parenting
relationship with that child.54 A psychological parent was
defined not by formal markers such as biology, marriage, or
adoption, but instead as a person who “on a continuing, day-today basis, through interaction, companionship, interplay, and
mutuality, fulfills the child’s psychological needs for a parent, as
well as the child’s physical needs.”55 Beyond the Best Interests of
the Child highlighted the significant harm to the child that could
occur if the child’s relationship with a psychological parent was
disrupted.56 Although not without controversy, the theories
developed in Beyond the Best Interests of the Child have had a
significant and enduring influence on the law’s approach to
resolving issues relating to the placement of children.57 For
example, in custody disputes between legal parents, “[t]he
continuity of functional caregiving is central . . . [and] the
primary caregiver is regularly considered the preferred custodial

Id.
Id.
53 See generally JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF
THE CHILD 17–20 (1973).
54 See id. at 31–34, 99–100.
55 Id. at 98.
56 See id. at 31–34.
57 June Carbone, Child Custody and the Best Interests of Children—A Review of
From Father’s Property to Children’s Rights: The History of Child Custody in the United
States, 29 FAM. L.Q. 721, 735 (1995) (book review) (“[O]ver the last thirty years, the single
most influential work on the interests of children is Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit’s concept of
the ‘psychological parent,’ with whom the child has emotionally bonded.”).
51
52
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parent.”58 Notably, over one thousand child custody cases have
cited Beyond the Best Interests of the Child.59
Subsequent research has provided further support for the
claims made in Beyond the Best Interests of the Child regarding
the importance of the relationship between a child and an
individual who functions as the child’s parent. For example,
subsequent research has found that attachment relationships
between children and adults form through an adult’s conduct as
a parental figure, not through his or her status as a legal
parent.60 Specifically, attachment relationships form through an
adult’s “provision of physical and emotional care, continuity or
consistency in the child’s life and emotional investment in the
child.”61 Importantly, there are a variety of ways in which the
attachment relationships formed between children and the
adults in their lives who function as parents are critical to
children’s well-being and development. These relationships “serve
to protect the child’s development, forming the building blocks for
the emerging sense of emotional security, the ability to cope with
stress, and an increased self-awareness.”62 “Secure attachment
relationships lead[] to the [child’s] ‘development of awareness,
social competence, conscience, emotional growth and emotional
regulation.’”63 Moreover, research in the fields of neurology and
psychology indicates that the primary environmental factor that
shapes brain development during the time of maximum growth is
a child’s attachment relationships.64
If the relationship between a child and an adult with
whom he or she has formed an attachment relationship is
disrupted, it can be very detrimental to the overall well-being of
the child.65 The disruption of attachment relationships can cause
significant both short- and long-term psychological and emotional
harm to children.66 For example, when the relationship between
Laufer-Ukeles & Blecher-Prigat, supra note 2, at 430.
DOUGLAS E. ABRAMS ET AL., CONTEMPORARY FAMILY LAW 806 (4th ed. 2015).
60 Linda D. Elrod, A Child’s Perspective of Defining a Parent: The Case for
Intended Parenthood, 25 BYU J. PUB. L. 245, 249–50 (2011).
61 Id. at 249.
62 Id. at 250.
63 Id. (quoting NAT’L RES. COUNCIL & INST. OF MED., FROM NEURONS TO
NEIGHBORHOODS: THE SCIENCE OF EARLY CHILDHOOD DEVELOPMENT 234, 226, 265 (Jack
P. Shonkoff & Deborah A. Phillips eds. 2000)).
64 Brief of Amici Curiae Nat’l Ass’n of Soc. Workers et al., in Support of
Petitioner-Appellant Debra H.’s Appeal at 11, Debra H. v. Janice R., 930 N.E.2d 184
(N.Y. 2010) (No. 106569/08), http://www.lambdalegal.org/in-court/legal-docs/debra-h_
ny_20100504_brief-of-nasw-amici [https://perma.cc/2LZU-XCQX].
65 Id. at 18.
66 Frank J. Dyer, Termination of Parental Rights in Light of Attachment
Theory: The Case of Kaylee, 10 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 5, 11 (2004) (“In sum, there are
numerous empirical findings that provide a solid research basis for predictions of long-term
58
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an infant or toddler and psychological parent is disrupted, the
child suffers anxiety and separation distress, and may have
difficulty trusting the individuals with whom they form
relationships in the future.67 In addition, the disruption of an
attachment relationship may cause children to regress in various
areas of development.68 Disruption of attachment relationships
during childhood also can lead to “aggression, fearful relationships,
academic problems in school and . . . elevated psychopathology,”69
and disruption experienced during childhood may continue to
affect an individual even during adulthood.70 Overall, “[o]nce an
adult has lived with and cared for a child for an extended period of
time and become that child’s psychological parent, removing that
‘parent’ from the child’s life results in emotional distress in the
child and a setback of ongoing development.”71 Recognizing the
extensive research highlighting the importance of relationships
between children and the individuals who function as their
parents, a number of jurisdictions have adopted equitable
parenthood doctrines.
B.

The Current State of Equitable Parenthood Doctrines
1. Jurisdictions That Have Adopted Equitable
Parenthood Doctrines

Following the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s decision in In
re Custody of H.S.H.-K., a number of other jurisdictions adopted
equitable parenthood doctrines through judicial or legislative
action. At least eighteen states have now adopted equitable
parenthood doctrines that grant child custody or visitation
rights in certain circumstances to individuals who have
functioned in a parental role to a child.72 Though many of the
equitable parenthood doctrines share core similarities with the
harm associated with disrupted attachment and loss of a child’s central parental love
objects.”); Elrod, supra note 60, at 250–51 (“Continuity of the parent-child relationship is
essential to the child’s overall well-being. When an attachment relationship is severed by
one parent dropping out of a child’s life, the child suffers emotional and psychological harm.
Disrupting attachments can turn a securely attached child into an insecure one.”); Rebecca
L. Scharf, Psychological Parentage, Troxel, and the Best Interests of the Child, 13 GEO. J.
GENDER & L. 615, 634–35 (2012).
67 GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 53, at 33.
68 See id. at 33–34.
69 Brief of Amici Curiae Nat’l Ass’n of Soc. Workers et al., supra note 64, at 18
(omission in original) (quoting Ana H. Marty et al., Supporting Secure Parent-Child
Attachments: The Role of the Non-Parental Caregiver, 175 EARLY CHILD DEV. &
CARE 271, 274 (2005)).
70 GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 53, at 34.
71 Scharf, supra note 66, at 634.
72 Fitschen & DeGroff, supra note 10, at 427–28.
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one adopted in In re Custody of H.S.H.-K., the doctrines in
existence today are not uniform in name or substance across
jurisdictions. Among the jurisdictions that have adopted
equitable parenthood doctrines, various titles have been given.
The most common titles include “de facto parentage, psychological
parent, in loco parentis, [and] parent by estoppel.”73 Jurisdictions
also differ with regard to whether individuals who would
otherwise satisfy the requirements of the relevant doctrine can
be recognized in situations in which the child already has two
formal legal parents.74 In addition, the position occupied by
individuals who qualify under these doctrines for purposes of
determining custody and visitation rights varies significantly
depending on the jurisdiction.75 More specifically, in a few
jurisdictions, individuals who qualify under these doctrines are
treated as equal to legal parents for purposes of both custody and
visitation determinations.76 In at least one jurisdiction, a
73 Grossman, supra note 8, at 677; Laufer-Ukeles & Blecher-Prigat, supra note
2, at 446 (“Thus, although achieving functional parental status requires meeting a
significant set of criteria, once the conditions are met, many jurisdictions treat functional
parental figures as replacements for and equivalent to formal parents.”).
74 COURTNEY JOSLIN ET AL., LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL & TRANSGENDER FAMILY
LAW § 7:14 (2016).
75 See Grossman, supra note 8, at 677.
76 See, e.g., Pitts v. Moore, 90 A.3d 1169, 1181 (Me. 2014) (“A determination
that a person is a de facto parent means that he or she is a parent on equal footing with
a biological or adoptive parent, that is to say, with the same opportunity for parental
rights and responsibilities.”); Latham v. Schwerdtfeger, 802 N.W.2d 66, 72 (Neb. 2011)
(“[T]he rights, duties, and liabilities of [a person in loco parentis] are the same as those
of the lawful parent.”); T.B. v. L.R.M., 786 A.2d 913, 916–17 (Pa. 2001) (stating that in
seeking child custody and visitation, “[t]he rights and liabilities arising out of an in loco
parentis relationship are, as the words imply, exactly the same as between parent and
child”); In re Parentage of L.B., 122 P.3d 161, 177 (Wash. 2005) (“We thus hold that
henceforth in Washington, a de facto parent stands in legal parity with an otherwise legal
parent, whether biological, adoptive, or otherwise.”). Whether the Establishment of a
Parent-Child Relationship Under Delaware’s de facto Parent Law Entitles Gabrielle to
Child’s Benefits on the Earnings Record of the Number Holder, Kathy. PR 01005.009
Delaware (Soc. Sec. Admin. July 10, 2012), https://secure.ssa.gov/poms.nsf/lnx/1501005009
[https://perma.cc/M5VC-MLDJ] (“According to Section 8-201 of Title 13 of the Delaware
Code, there is no legal difference between the parent-child relationship of a natural
mother/father and child, an adoptive mother/father and child, and a de facto parent and
child.”); see also Conover v. Conover, 146 A.3d 433, 453 (Md. 2016) (“We hold that de
facto parents have standing to contest custody or visitation and need not show parental
unfitness or exceptional circumstances before a trial court can apply a best interests of
the child analysis.”). See Grossman, supra note 8, at 677 (“In a few states, once a third
party has established de facto or psychological parent status, she stands in parity to a
legal parent.”). In two of these jurisdictions, Delaware and Maine, parents who qualify
under the relevant equitable parenthood doctrines are designated by statute as legal
parents. JOSLIN ET AL., supra note 74, § 7:14; DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 13, §§ 8-201, 8-203
(2016); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-a, §§ 1851, 1891 (2016) (establishing that an
adjudication of de facto parentage is one way to establish legal parentage). Although the
New Jersey Supreme Court stated that psychological parents “stand[ ] in parity” with
genetic parents, it also stated that if all else is equal in applying the best interests of the
child standard, custody should be given to the legal parent, meaning that psychological
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qualifying individual is treated as equal to a legal parent for
purposes of visitation determinations, but not custody
determinations.77 In a significant number of jurisdictions qualifying
individuals are merely given standing to seek visitation and/or
custody,78 and must meet higher burdens (the language of which
differ by jurisdiction) than legal parents79 in order to obtain such
rights.80 Finally, the elements that a petitioner must meet in order
to qualify under these doctrines also differ somewhat by
jurisdiction.81 All of the doctrines, however, seek to promote the
best interests of children by providing visitation- or custodyrelated rights to individuals who, under specified circumstances,
have functioned as a child’s parent. While cases applying equitable
parents do not actually stand in parity to legal parents for purposes of custody. V.C. v.
M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539, 554 (N.J. 2000).
77 See, e.g., V.C., 748 A.2d at 554 (“[U]nder ordinary circumstances when the
evidence concerning the child’s best interests (as between a legal parent and
psychological parent) is in equipoise, custody will be awarded to the legal parent.
Visitation, however, will be the presumptive rule, subject to the considerations set forth
in N.J.S.A. 9:2–4, as would be the case if two natural parents were in conflict.”); see also
Laufer-Ukeles & Blecher-Prigat supra note 2, at 449 (“In fact, courts applying functional
parenthood have in practice followed [the] presumption [that a functional parent is
entitled to visitation but not custody] despite conceptually equalizing parenthood.”); see
also Grossman, supra note 8, at 677.
78 “In two jurisdictions, [Arkansas and Wisconsin,] courts have held that a de
facto parent may seek visitation, but not custody.” JOSLIN ET AL., supra note 74, § 7:9.
79 The standard generally governing custody determinations between fit legal
parents is the “best interests of the child” standard. HOMER H. CLARK, JR. & ANN LAQUER
ESTIN, DOMESTIC RELATIONS: CASES AND PROBLEMS ON DOMESTIC RELATIONS 959 (7th ed.
2005) (citations omitted). With regard to visitation, however, the prevailing approach is that
a fit legal parent is entitled to visitation unless the court determines that visitation would be
significantly harmful to the child’s well-being. ABRAMS ET AL., supra note 59, at 915; CLARK
& ESTIN, supra, at 982–83; ROBERT E. OLIPHANT & NANCY VER STEEGH, FAMILY LAW:
EXAMPLES AND EXPLANATIONS 180 (3rd ed. 2010); UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 407
(NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, amended 1973).
80 See, e.g., Kinnard v. Kinnard, 43 P.3d 150, 154 (Ala. 2002) (holding in a
custody dispute with a psychological parent, a legal parent should receive custody
“unless the trial court determines that the parent is unfit, has abandoned the child, or
that the welfare of the child requires that a non-parent receive custody.”); Egan v.
Fridlund-Horne, 211 P.3d 1213, 1222, 1224 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2009) (holding that in order
to obtain visitation, a person who stands in loco parentis must “rebut[ ] [the]
presumption that a fit parent’s decision to deny or limit visitation is in the child’s best
interests,” while a legal parent is entitled to visitation “unless the court finds that it
would seriously endanger the child’s” well-being); A.C. v. N.J., 1 N.E.3d 685, 694 n.6
(Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (“Even assuming Partner is a de facto custodian, she was still
required to overcome the presumption in favor of Mother as the natural parent.”);
McAllister v. McAllister, 779 N.W.2d 652, 658 (N.D. 2010) (“When a psychological parent
and a natural parent each seek a court-ordered award of custody, the natural parent’s
paramount right to custody prevails unless the court finds it in the child’s best interests
to award custody to the psychological parent to prevent serious harm or detriment to the
welfare of the child.” (quoting Cox v. Cox., 613 N.W.2d 516, 521–22 (N.D. 2000)); Middleton
v. Johnson, 633 S.E.2d 162, 171–72 (S.C. Ct. App. 2006) (stating that a person who qualifies
as a psychological parent is entitled to visitation only if he or she is able to prove that
“compelling circumstances” exist and providing as an example of compelling circumstances
a situation where denying visitation would cause significant harm to the child).
81 See infra notes 83–111 and accompanying text.
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parenthood doctrines in the context of same-sex parenting
arrangements have received the most attention from legal scholars
and commentators, individuals who have functioned as parents
within the context of different-sex relationships may also seek
relief under these doctrines.82
The most widely adopted test for determining whether an
individual qualifies for relief under a state’s equitable
parenthood doctrine is the one articulated in In re Custody of
H.S.H.-K.83 Many jurisdictions have adopted identical or very
similar tests.84 While not every jurisdiction has adopted a test
identical to the one set forth in In re Custody of H.S.H.-K., the
82 In fact, the common requirements of the equitable parenthood doctrines
contain gender neutral language. See infra notes 83–85 and accompanying text.
83 Brief of Amici Curiae Nat’l Ctr. for Lesbian Rights et al., supra note 30. This
test requires the petitioner to prove that: (1) the legal parent fostered and consented to
the petitioner forming a parent-like relationship to the child; (2) the petitioner lived in a
household with the child; (3) the petitioner “assumed obligations of parenthood by taking
significant responsibility for the child’s care, education and development, including
contributing towards the child’s support, without expectation of financial compensation;”
and (4) “the petitioner has been in a parental role for a length of time sufficient to have
established with the child a bonded, dependent relationship parental in nature.” In re
Custody of H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d 419, 421 (Wis. 1995).
84 In re K.H., 773 S.E.2d 20, 25 n.7 (W. Va. 2015) (“The general legal principles
associated with the psychological parent concept were addressed in a 1995 Wisconsin
case, and the criteria enumerated in that four-element test have now become
incorporated within the definitions of the psychological parent doctrine utilized by most
reviewing courts.”). Courts in Maryland, New Jersey, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and
Washington have adopted the test articulated in In re Custody of H.S.H-K. See Conover
v. Conover, 146 A.3d 433, 439 (Md. 2016); V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539, 551 (N.J. 2000);
Rubano v. Dicenzo, 759 A.2d 959, 974 (R.I. 2000) (adopting the approach of V.C., 748
A.2d 539, which adopted the approach of In re H.S.H-K, 533 N.W.2d 419); Middleton v.
Johnson, 633 S.E.2d 162, 168 (S.C. Ct. App. 2006); In re Parentage of L.B., 122 P.3d 161,
176 (Wash. 2005). Very similar approaches have been adopted in a number of other
jurisdictions. See, e.g., E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d 886, 891 (Mass. 1999) (defining a
de facto parent as “one who has no biological relation to the child, but has participated
in the child’s life as a member of the child’s family. The de facto parent resides with the
child and, with the consent and encouragement of the legal parent, performs a share of
caretaking functions at least as great as the legal parent. The de facto parent shapes the
child’s daily routine, addresses his developmental needs, disciplines the child, provides
for his education and medical care, and serves as a moral guide.” (internal citations
omitted)); T.B. v. L.R.M., 786 A.2d 913, 916–20 (Pa. 2001) (explaining that “[t]he status
of in loco parentis embodies two ideas; first, the assumption of a parental status, and,
second, the discharge of parental duties” applies “where the child has established strong
psychological bonds with a person who, although not a biological parent, has lived with
the child and provided care, nurture, and affection, assuming in the child’s eye a stature
like that of a parent,” and involves situations where the legal parent has consented to
and encouraged the petitioner to assume parental status); In re K.H., 773. S.E.2d 20, 26
(W. Va. 2015) (explaining that “[a] psychological parent is a person who, on a continuing
day-to-day basis, through interaction, companionship, interplay, and mutuality, fulfills
a child’s psychological and physical needs for a parent and provides for the child’s
emotional and financial support . . . [and that] [t]he resulting relationship between the
psychological parent and the child must be of substantial, not temporary, duration and
must have begun with the consent and encouragement of the child’s legal parent or
guardian . . . [and that] . . . [i]n the cases in which this Court has determined a person to
be a psychological parent to a child, that person typically has resided in the child’s
household and interacted with the child on a daily basis”).
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four elements included in the test, in one form or another,
represent the elements that appear most frequently in the
eligibility requirements of equitable parenthood doctrines.85
With regard to the first element, many states’ equitable
parenthood doctrines require that the petitioner demonstrate
that the child’s legal parent consented to or encouraged the
formation of a parent-like relationship between the petitioner
and the child.86 This requirement is viewed as important for a
variety of reasons. As an initial matter, the consent requirement
seeks to avoid judicial infringement on a legal parent’s
fundamental right to make decisions regarding the care and
custody of her child by requiring that the legal parent consents
to or encourages, as reflected by her words or conduct, the
formation of a parent-like relationship between the petitioner
and the child.87 This requirement is essential because it places
the legal parent in control and provides her with complete power
to maintain a “zone of privacy” around her child and herself.88
However, this requirement also recognizes that if a legal parent
“wishes to maintain that zone of privacy she cannot invite a third
party to function as a parent to her child and cannot cede over to
that third party parental authority the exercise of which may
create a profound bond with the child.”89 The consent requirement
seeks to ensure that the rights of legal parents to determine who
functions in a parental role to their children are respected and
shields legal parents from intrusive and burdensome custody and
visitation claims from individuals who did not have the legal
parent’s consent to form a parent-like relationship with the child.90
See infra notes 86, 91, 98.
Katharine T. Bartlett, Prioritizing Past Caretaking in Child-Custody
Decisionmaking, 77 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 29, 62 (2014) (“Contemporary definitions of
de facto parent typically depend, as do the ALI Principles, on, a prior, residential,
caretaking relationship with the child, developed with the consent or acquiescence of the
parent.”). See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-201(c) (2009); Pitts v. Moore, 90 A.3d 1169,
1179–80 (Me. 2014); Conover, 146 A.3d at 439–40; E.N.O., 711 N.E.2d at 892; V.C., 748
A.2d at 551; T.B., 786 A.2d at 918–19; Rubano, 759 A.2d at 974; Middleton, 633 S.E.2d
at 168; In re Parentage of L.B., 122 P.3d at 176; In re K.H., 773 S.E.2d at 25–28; In re
Custody of H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d at 421. Even when not stated specifically in the
definition of the equitable parenthood status, courts often consider whether the legal
parent consented to the formation of the relationship. See, e.g., Latham v. Schwerdtfeger,
802 N.W.2d 66, 76 (Neb. 2011).
87 Rubano, 759 A.2d at 974; In re Custody of H.S.H-K., 533 N.W.2d at 436
(“This exercise of equitable power protects parental autonomy and constitutional rights
by requiring that the parent-like relationship develop only with the consent and
assistance of the biological or adoptive parent.”).
88 V.C., 748 A.2d at 552.
89 Id.
90 Brief of Amici Curie Family Law Acads. in Support of Petitioner-Appellant
at 8–10, Debra H. v. Janice R., 61 A.D.3d 460 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009) (No. 106569/08),
http://www.lambdalegal.org/sites/default/files/2009-11-16_fam._law_academics_
amicus_br.pdf [https://perma.cc/K2CE-ANR9].
85

86
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The second element commonly included within equitable
parenthood doctrines is that the petitioner resided in a
household with the child.91 While a few states specifically
indicate a minimum amount of time for which the petitioner
must have resided with the child,92 others do not.93 When this
element is considered with the other elements, however, it
becomes clear that the amount of time the petitioner resided
with the child must have been sufficient for the petitioner and
child to have been able to form a parent-child bond.94 This
requirement is viewed as important because it “provides an
additional indicator that the [petitioner] has established a
genuine familial relationship with the child,” the abrupt
termination of which likely would harm the child.95 In addition,
the satisfaction of this requirement provides evidence of both the
legal parent’s consent to the formation of the relationship
between the petitioner and child and the commitment of the
legal parent and petitioner to mutually provide care for the
child.96 Moreover, this requirement seeks to further protect the

91 Bartlett, supra note 86, at 62 (“Contemporary definitions of de facto parent
typically depend, as do the ALI Principles, on, a prior, residential, caretaking
relationship with the child, developed with the consent or acquiescence of the parent.”).
See, e.g., Pitts, 90 A.3d at 1179–80; Conover, 146 A.3d at 439–40; V.C., 748 A.2d at 551;
T.B., 786 A.2d at 917; Rubano, 759 A.2d at 974; Middleton, 633 S.E.2d at 168; In re
Parentage of L.B., 122 P.3d at 176; In re Custody of H.S.H-K, 533 N.W.2d at 420.
92 See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 16-831.01(1) (2016) (defining de facto parent as “an
individual . . . [w]ho[ ] . . . [l]ived with the child in the same household [since] the child’s
birth or adoption,” or “for at least [ten] of the [twelve] months preceding the” petition for
de facto parent status); IND. CODE § 31-9-2-35.5 (2016) (setting forth requirements for
how long a petitioner has to have resided with the child in order to be a de facto parent);
ALI PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
§ 2.03 (AM. LAW INST. 2002) (requiring that an individual reside “with the child for at
least two years” in order to be considered a de facto parent). To be a de facto custodian
under Kentucky law, “the primary caregiver for, and financial supporter of, a child who
has resided with the person for a period of six (6) months or more if the child is under
three (3) years of age.” If the child is over three years of age, the de facto custodian must
have resided with the child for one year. KY. REV. STAT. § 403.270(1)(a) (West 2016). In
addition, courts have interpreted the Kentucky de facto parent statute to preclude
recognition as de facto parents of individuals who raised the child along with the legal
parent. See B.F. v. T.D., 194 S.W.3d 310, 310–12 (Ky. 2006) (holding that a partner who
lived with the mother and the mother’s adopted child as a family did not have standing
to seek custody because the child was in the physical custody of the legal parent).
93 See, e.g., Pitts, 90 A.3d at 1179–80; Conover, 146 A.3d at 439–40; E.N.O. v.
L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d 886, 892 (Mass. 1999); V.C., 748 A.2d at 551; T.B., 786 A.2d at 918–
19; Rubano, 759 A.2d at 974; Middleton, 633 S.E.2d at 168; In re Parentage of L.B., 122
P.3d at 176; In re Custody of H.S.H.-K, 533 N.W.2d at 421.
94 Brief of Amici Curie Family Law Acads. in Support of Petitioner-Appellant,
supra note 90, at 10.
95 Brief of Amici Curiae Nat’l Ctr. for Lesbian Rights et al., supra note 30, at 21.
96 Id.; Brief of Amici Curie Family Law Acads. in Support of PetitionerAppellant, supra note 90, at 20, n.7.
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rights of the legal parent by significantly restricting the class of
individuals who can make equitable parenthood claims.97
The final two common elements of equitable parenthood
doctrines, which relate to the petitioner assuming the
obligations of parenthood and forming a parent-child bond with
the child, are generally viewed as the most important98 and appear
in some form in most equitable parenthood doctrines.99 The
requirement that the petitioner “assumed obligations of
parenthood by taking significant responsibility for the child’s care,
education and development, including contributing towards the
child’s support, without expectation of financial compensation,” is
viewed as important for a number of reasons.100 As an initial
matter, the requirement significantly restricts the class of
individuals who are eligible to make claims under the doctrine by
excluding anyone who has cared for or supported the child “with[]
the expectation of financial compensation.”101 More importantly, it
seeks to ensure that the petitioner actually functioned as the child’s
parent,102 limiting eligibility “to those adults who have served
literally as one of the child’s de facto parents.”103 The provision of
financial support is not determinative in assessing whether an
individual has functioned as a child’s parent and assumed the
obligations of parenthood.104 Instead, the inquiry focuses more
broadly on the nature and quality of the petitioner’s parenting
actions and the child’s response to those actions.105
Middleton, 633 S.E.2d at 169.
V.C., 748 A.2d at 551 (“[M]ost important, a parent-child bond must be
forged.”); Middleton, 633 S.E.2d at 169 (“The last two prongs are the most important
because they ensure both that the psychological parent assumed the responsibilities of
parenthood and that there exists a parent-child bond between the psychological parent
and child.”).
99 See In re E.L.M.C., 100 P.3d 546, 559 (Colo. App. 2004) (“Who may be
deemed a psychological parent for the purposes of seeking and receiving an award of
parental responsibilities has been variously defined. Common to these definitions is a
relationship with deep emotional bonds such that the child recognizes the person,
independent of the legal form of the relationship, as a parent from whom they receive
daily guidance and nurturance.”). See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-201(c) (2016);
Kinnard v. Kinnard, 43 P.3d 150, 154 (Ala. 2002); Conover v. Conover, 146 A.3d 433, 453
(Md. 2016); V.C., 748 A.2d at 551; McAllister v. McAllister, 779 N.W.2d 652, 658 (N.D.
2010); T.B. v. L.R.M., 786 A.2d 913, 914, 916–20 (Pa. 2001); Rubano v. Dicenzo, 759 A.2d
959, 967 (R.I. 2000); Middleton, 633 S.E.2d at 168; In re Parentage of L.B., 122 P.3d 161,
176 (Wash. 2005); In re K.H., 773 S.E.2d 20, 24 (W. Va. 2015); In re Custody of H.S.H.K., 533 N.W.2d 419, 421 (Wis. 1995).
100 In re Custody of H.S.H-K., 533 N.W.2d at 421.
101 Id.; see also Rubano, 759 A.2d at 974 (“[A] relationship based on payment by
the legal parent to the third party will not qualify.” (quoting V.C., 748 A.2d at 552)).
102 Brief of Amici Curie Family Law Acads. in Support of Petitioner-Appellant,
supra note 90, at 20.
103 Rubano, 759 A.2d at 974.
104 V.C., 748 A.2d at 553.
105 Id.
97

98
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The requirement that “the petitioner has been in a
parental role for a length of time sufficient to have established
with the child a bonded, dependent relationship parental in
nature” is viewed as essential for a variety of reasons, not the
least of which is that protecting the well-being of children is one
of family law’s most critical goals.106 The requirement is directly
related to the child development research, described above,
regarding children and the adults with whom they form
attachment relationships.107 More specifically, if a functional
parent and child have formed a parent-child bond, then severing
that relationship can have significant harmful effects on the
child’s short- and long-term well-being.108 Thus, at the heart of
this requirement is a deep concern for the well-being of children
who have developed parent-child bonds with adults who are not
their legal parents and who are facing disruption of that
relationship.109 Testimony from experts such as child psychologists,
psychiatrists, and social workers regarding the existence and
strength of the parent-child bond generally is necessary for a court
to determine whether the petitioner has satisfied this
requirement.110 The development of a parent-child bond between
the child and the petitioner is emphasized heavily in court
decisions applying equitable parenthood doctrines because it has
long been considered the duty of courts to protect children from
harm, and this requirement is the one most clearly linked to the
well-being of the children involved.111
Overall, proponents of equitable parenthood doctrines
argue that the common elements in determining eligibility set
106 In re Custody of H.S.H-K., 533 N.W.2d 419, 421 (Wis. 1995); Jane C.
Murphy, Rules, Responsibility and Commitment to Children: The New Language of
Morality in Family Law, 60 U. PITT. L. REV. 1111, 1180–81 (1999) (identifying the
“protect[ion] of children” as the “central moral goal of family law”).
107 See supra notes 53–71 and accompanying text; see also In re Marriage of
Martin, 42 P.3d 75, 77–78 (Colo. App. 2002) (citing the work of Freud, Goldstein, and
Solnit for the proposition that “[t]he psychological parent is someone other than a
biological parent who develops a parent-child relationship with a child through day-today interaction, companionship, and caring for the child . . . [and] once this bond forms,
many psychologists believe that breaking up the relationship would be harmful to a
child’s emotional development” (citing JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., THE BEST INTERESTS
OF THE CHILD: THE LEAST DETRIMENTAL ALTERNATIVE 11–13, 104, 105 (1996)).
108 See supra notes 56, 65–71; see also Brief of Amici Curie Nat’l Ctr. for Lesbian
Rights, et al., supra note 30, at 24; Brief of Amici Curiae Nat’l Ass’n of Soc. Workers, et
al., in Support of Petitioner-Appellant Debra H’s Appeal, supra note 64 at 10.
109 In re E.L.M.C., 100 P.3d 546, 561 (Colo. App. 2004) (citing a number of cases
for the proposition that “[t]his deep concern about emotional harm to the child as a result
of separation from a psychological parent is echoed by other jurisdictions”).
110 V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539, 553 (N.J. 2000).
111 See Mary L. Bonauto, et al., Equity Actions Filed by De Facto Parents, in
PATERNITY AND THE LAW OF PARENTAGE IN MASSACHUSETTS § 12.2.2(a) (2d ed. 2009)
(describing “[Massachusetts’] longstanding parens patriae powers, in which the state has
a duty to promote the welfare of children.”).
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an appropriately high threshold.112 More specifically, the
common elements severely restrict the class of individuals who
qualify as equitable parents by “protect[ing] the legal parent
against claims by neighbors, caretakers, baby sitters, nannies,
au pairs, nonparental relatives, and family friends.”113 Only
individuals who have resided in the same household as the child
and who have, with the consent and encouragement of the child’s
legal parent, taken on the obligations of parenthood in a manner
that results in the formation of a parent-child bond are eligible
for relief under the common elements of the equitable
parenthood doctrines. Proponents argue that these elements
strike the appropriate balance by respecting the rights of legal
parents while serving the essential function of protecting from
harm children who form parent-child bonds with non-legal
parents.114 As one court stated, “emotional harm to a young child
is intrinsic in the termination or significant curtailment of the
child’s relationship with a psychological parent under any
definition of that term.”115 It is precisely this harm that equitable
parenthood doctrines seek to prevent.
2. Jurisdictions That Have Declined to Adopt
Equitable Parenthood Doctrines
To date, in several jurisdictions courts that have ruled on
the issue have expressly declined to adopt equitable parenthood
doctrines that provide rights relating to visitation or custody to
functional parents over the wishes of formal legal parents. As an
initial matter, in declining to adopt equitable parenthood
doctrines not expressly provided for by state statute, a number
of courts have cited a lack of judicial authority or, similarly, the
better position of the legislature, to adopt and define these
doctrines.116 Another common reason courts have given for
112 Conover v. Conover, 146 A.3d 433, 447 (Md. 2016) (“As other courts adopting
this test have recognized, these factors set forth a high bar for establishing de facto parent
status . . . .”); Brief of Amici Curiae Nat’l Ctr. for Lesbian Rights et al., supra note 30, at 23.
113 In re E.L.M.C., 100 P.3d at 546.
114 See supra notes 88–90 and accompanying text.
115 In re E.L.M.C., 100 P.3d at 561; Middleton v. Johnson, 633 S.E.2d 162, 169
(S.C. Ct. App. 2006) (stating that “inherent in the bond between child and psychological
parent is the risk of emotional harm to the child should the relationship be curtailed or
terminated” (quoting In re E.L.M.C., 100 P.3d at 560)).
116 See, e.g., In re Parentage of Scarlett Z.-D., 28 N.E.3d 776, 790 (Ill. 2015)
(declining to adopt a functional parent doctrine because “[t]he very difficulty of [the]
policy considerations [surrounding recognition of functional parenthood], and the
legislature’s superior institutional competence to pursue this debate, suggest that
legislative and not judicial solutions are preferable”); Debra H. v. Janice R., 930 N.E.2d
184, 193 (N.Y. 2010) (“[A]ny change in the meaning of ‘parent’ under our law should come
by way of legislative enactment . . . .”), abrogated by Brooke S.B. v. Elizabeth A.C.C., 61
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rejecting these doctrines relates to the belief that by granting
functional parents visitation- or custody-related rights over the
wishes of formal legal parents, the doctrines infringe on the
fundamental rights of formal legal parents to direct the care,
custody, and control of their children.117 In addition, a number of
courts have declined to adopt such doctrines on the grounds that
the standards employed in the doctrines are complicated,
nonobjective, fact intensive, and lead to unpredictable results.
These courts have stressed that the adoption of such doctrines
would result in litigation that is costly, lengthy, and contentious.118
Similarly, some courts have maintained that formal methods of
establishing parental status for a nonbiological parent raising a
child within a same-sex relationship, such as adoption, provide a
straightforward, bright-line approach to parental determinations
that is superior in promoting certainty and stability for parents and
their children.119 Notably, several courts have cited the availability
of second parent adoption in the jurisdiction in support of decisions
declining to adopt equitable parenthood doctrines.120
N.E.3d 488 (N.Y. 2016); Jones v. Barlow, 154 P.3d 808, 817 (Utah 2007) (declining to
“overstep its bounds and invade the purview of the legislature” by adopting an equitable
parent doctrine); Titchenal v. Dexter, 693 A.2d 682, 689 (Vt. 1997) (reasoning that
“[g]iven the complex social and practical ramifications of expanding the classes of
persons entitled to assert parental rights by seeking custody or visitation, the
Legislature is better equipped to deal with the problem”); LP v. LF, 338 P.3d 908, 919–
20 (Wy. 2014) (“[W]hen we review the involvement of our legislature in the parent-child
relationship, we do not find a gap of sufficient size to permit us to adopt the de facto
parent doctrine. . . . We . . . defer[ ] to the Wyoming Legislature to recognize and define
that relationship if it wishes to do so.”); see also In re N.I.V.S., No. 04–14–00108–CV,
2015 WL 1120913, at *7 (Tex. App. Mar. 11, 2015) (“[W]e need not discuss the elements
of the psychological parent doctrine because we are confined to examining standing
within the statutory framework of the Family Code.” (citing In re H.G., 267 S.W.2d 120,
123–24 (Tex. Ct. App. 2008))); Stadter v. Siperko, 661 S.E.2d 494, 498–99 (Va. App. 2008)
(declining to “implement—by judicial fiat—a visitation doctrine of de facto or
psychological parent in the Commonwealth”).
117 Janice M. v. Margaret K., 948 A.2d 73, 78–87 (Md. 2008), overruled by
Conover v. Conover, 146 A.3d 433 (Md. 2016); Debra H., 930 N.E.2d at 193; Jones, 154
P.3d at 816, 818.
118 Debra H., 930 N.E.2d at 192; Jones, 154 P.3d at 816; Titchenal, 693 A.2d at 687.
119 See, e.g., Debra H., 930 N.E.2d at 192–96.
120 A.H. v. M.P., 857 N.E.2d 1061, 1073–74 (Mass. 2006) (stating that “[i]n this
jurisdiction, same-sex couples, like heterosexual couples, are free to adopt the children
of their partners,” and refusing to apply an equitable parenthood doctrine in a situation
in which the plaintiff had planned with the defendant for the child’s birth, helped care for
the child for the first year and a half of his life, and was referred to as “Mama” by the child.);
Debra H., 930 N.E.2d at 194 (stating that “the right of second-parent adoption . . . furnishes
the biological and adoptive parents of children—and, importantly, those children
themselves—with a simple and understandable rule by which to guide their relationships
and order their lives[,]” and refusing to apply an equitable parenthood doctrine despite the
fact that the plaintiff had served as a loving and caring parental figure during the first two
and a half years of the child’s life); Titchenal, 693 A.2d at 683–87 (refusing to apply an
equitable parenthood doctrine despite the fact that the plaintiff had held herself out as the
child’s parent and had provided the majority of care for the child from the child’s birth until
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II.

DEVELOPMENTS IN ACCESS TO AVENUES TO
ESTABLISHING FORMAL LEGAL PARENT STATUS FOR
NONBIOLOGICAL PARENTS IN SAME-SEX RELATIONSHIPS

A.

Avenues of Establishing Formal Legal Parenthood
Currently Available to Nonbiological Parents in SameSex Relationships
1. Marriage

Today, many of the avenues available for establishing
formal legal parenthood are based upon marriage. Until
relatively recently, same-sex couples were not able to marry in
any jurisdiction in the United States, and thus all of the
marriage-based avenues for establishing legal parenthood were
simply unavailable to same-sex couples. In 2004, however,
Massachusetts became the first state to legalize same-sex
marriage.121 Between 2004 and 2015, same-sex marriage
expanded rapidly throughout the United States, culminating
with the Supreme Court’s decision in Obergefell v. Hodges, which
held that the remaining state bans on same-sex marriage were
unconstitutional and resulted in the recognition of same-sex
marriage in every U.S. jurisdiction.122 This decision has given
same-sex couples access to avenues to establishing formal
parenthood that were previously unavailable to them.
a. The Marital Presumption of Paternity
The marital presumption of paternity, under which a
husband is presumed by law to be the father of a child conceived
by or born to his wife during the marriage, is “a longstanding
legal presumption in the United States” that still exists in some
form in every state.123 Pursuant to Obergefell, in which the Court
explicitly stated that states may not “bar same-sex couples from
marriage on the same terms as accorded to couples of the
opposite sex,”124 the marital presumption of paternity should
apply to both different- and same-sex spouses of women who give

the child was three and a half years old, and stressing that nonbiological parents in samesex relationships can protect themselves through adoption).
121 Looking Back at the Legalization of Gay Marriage in Mass., BOS. GLOBE (June
26, 2015), https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2015/06/26/looking-back-legalization-gaymarriage-mass/uhCeyrSeJtWty9tSUde1PI/story.html [https://perma.cc/UP7L-L5NS].
122 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2608 (2015).
123 Feinberg, supra note 1, at 341.
124 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2607.
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birth.125 Significantly, most, though not all, of the courts that
have ruled on the issue thus far have concluded that the marital
presumption of paternity applies to the same-sex spouse of a
woman who gives birth to or conceives a child during the
marriage.126 However, due to the lack of court decisions in many
states regarding the applicability of the marital presumption to
same-sex couples, the absence of uniform results among court
decisions addressing the issue, and the uncertainty regarding
whether the presumption, even if extended to female same-sex
couples, also would apply to married male same-sex couples,127
LGBT rights experts continue to strongly recommend that married
same-sex couples who conceive a child during the marriage seek

125 COURTNEY JOSLIN ET AL., LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL & TRANSGENDER FAMILY
LAW § 5:22 (2016) (“After Obergefell v. Hodges, there is no question that all marriagebased parentage rules—including the marital presumption—must be applied equally to
same-sex spouses (although some states may initially resist this proposition).” (footnote
omitted)). This reading of Obergefell is further supported by the Supreme Court’s recent
decision in Pavan v. Smith, in which the Court held that under Obergefell, Arkansas
could not refuse to list the name of a birth mother’s female spouse on the child’s birth
certificate when state law generally required the name of birth mothers’ male spouses to
appear on birth certificates. Pavan v. Smith, 137 S. Ct. 2075, 2079 (2017). However,
Pavan concerned only birth certificates, not the presumption of parentage itself, and
generally “a birth certificate is merely prima facie evidence of the information stated
within.” JOSLIN ET AL., supra note 74, § 5:24.
126 See, e.g., Barse v. Pasternak, No. HHBFA124030541S, 2015 WL 600973, at *10
(Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 16, 2015) (“[T]his court finds that the protections of Connecticut’s
common-law presumption of legitimacy apply equally to children of same-sex and oppositesex married couples and that the marital presumption applies equally to same-sex and
opposite-sex marriages.”); Gartner v. Iowa Dep’t of Pub. Health, 830 N.W.2d 335, 340–41
(Iowa 2013) (holding that due to its language excluding married female same-sex
couples, the existing marital presumption statute was unconstitutional and striking
down the portion of the statute containing the exclusionary language); see also Kerry
Abrams & R. Kent Piacenti, Immigration’s Family Values, 100 VA. L. REV. 629, 709
(2014) (“Most states that recognize same-sex marriages, for example, also extend the
marital presumption of paternity to gay and lesbian couples, even though in many of
these instances there is no chance that the marital parent is also the genetic parent.”);
cf. Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, 912 A.2d 951, 970–71 (Vt. 2006) (holding that
because civil unions granted same-sex couples all of the rights and obligations of
marriage, the marital presumption of paternity applied to same-sex couples who had
entered into civil unions). But see In re Paczkowski v. Paczkowski, 128 A.D.3d 968, 969
(N.Y. App. Div. 2015) (holding that the statutory marital presumptions of paternity did
not apply to the wife of woman who conceived a child during the marriage, “since the
presumption of legitimacy [the statutes] create is one of a biological relationship, not of
legal status, and, as the nongestational spouse in a same-sex marriage, there is no
possibility that [the wife] is the child’s biological parent” (citations omitted)). The cases
generally involved female same-sex couples, and it is unclear whether courts will be
willing to apply the presumption to male same-sex couples, who require a surrogate in
order to conceive a child via ART. See Susan Frelich Appleton, Presuming Women:
Revisiting the Presumption of Legitimacy in the Same-Sex Couples Era, 86 B.U. L. REV.
227, 260–61 (2006); Alexandra Eisman, The Extension of the Presumption of Legitimacy
to Same-Sex Couples in New York, 19 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 579, 593–95 (2013).
127 See Appleton, supra note 126, at 260–61; Eisman, supra note 126, at 593–95.
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adoption or a parentage judgment to ensure that the nonbiological
parent is recognized as a legal parent across jurisdictions.128
b. Consent to a Spouse’s Use of Assisted
Reproductive Technology
Under statutory or common law rules in most
jurisdictions, a husband who consents to his wife’s use of
assisted reproductive technology (ART) with the intent to be the
resulting child’s parent is presumed or conclusively determined
to be the child’s second legal parent, regardless of whether he is
the biological father.129 Among these jurisdictions, some require
that the consent be in writing and/or that the procedure be
performed by or under the supervision of a physician, while
others do not.130 Pursuant to Obergefell, these laws should apply
to both different- and same-sex spouses who consent to their
wife’s use of ART with the intent to be the resulting child’s
parent.131 Although only a handful of courts have ruled on the
issue, those that have addressed it thus far have held that the
ART parentage rules, even if set forth in terms that reference
married different-sex couples, are equally applicable to married
same- and different-sex couples.132 Again, even in jurisdictions
that have adopted marriage-based parentage rules in the ART
context, due to the lack of court decisions in many states
regarding the applicability of these rules to same-sex couples
and the uncertainty regarding whether such rules encompass
married male same-sex couples even if they are extended to
128 See, e.g., NAT’L CTR. FOR LESBIAN RIGHTS, LEGAL RECOGNITION OF LGBT
FAMILIES
(2016),
http://www.nclrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/Legal_
Recognition_of_LGBT_Families.pdf (2016) [https://perma.cc/Y5PM-7PDX] (“Regardless
of whether you are married or in a civil union or comprehensive domestic partnership,
NCLR always encourages non-biological and non-adoptive parents to get an adoption or
parentage judgment, even if you are named on your child’s birth certificate.”).
129 JOSLIN ET AL., supra note 74, § 3:3.
130 Id.
131 Id. (“After the decision in Obergefell v. Hodges requiring that states permit
and recognize marriages between same-sex spouses on the ‘same terms and conditions’
as for different-sex spouses, these rules must be applied equally to same-sex couples who
have children through assisted reproduction during their marriage.” (footnote omitted)).
132 See, e.g., Della Corte v. Ramirez, 961 N.E.2d 601, 602–03 (Mass. App. Ct.
2012); Wendy G-M. v. Erin G-M., 45 Misc. 3d 574, 582 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2014); Roe v. Patton,
No. 2:15–cv–00253–DB, 2015 WL 4476734, at *4 (D. Utah July 22, 2015); see also
Shineovich and Kemp, 214 P.3d 29, 40 (Or. Ct. App. 2009) (holding, in a decision before
the state had legalized same-sex marriage, that the marriage-based ART-provisions
extended to female same-sex couples in domestic partnerships because under state law
domestic partners were entitled to all of the rights and protections provided to married
couples); Douglas NeJaime, Marriage Equality and the New Parenthood, 129 HARV. L.
REV. 1185, 1244, n.353 (citing In re Parentage of L.D.S., No. 2015-DM-000892, at 3–4
(Kan. Dist. Ct. Sept. 16, 2015)).
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female same-sex couples,133 LGBT rights experts continue to
forcefully recommend that married same-sex couples who
conceive a child during the marriage seek adoption or parentage
judgments to ensure that the nonbiological parent is recognized
as a legal parent across jurisdictions.134
While in most jurisdictions the ART parentage provisions
are limited to married couples, ten jurisdictions have expanded
the rules to encompass unmarried couples such that a man who
consents to a woman’s use of ART with the intent to be the
resulting child’s parent is considered the child’s formal legal
parent.135 In six of these ten jurisdictions, the language of the
ART parentage provisions encompasses unmarried same-sex
couples as well as unmarried different-sex couples.136 A recent
decision by New York’s highest court in a case involving an
unmarried same-sex couple adopted a slightly different
approach, providing standing as a parent for purposes of custody
and visitation actions, as opposed to formal legal parent status,
to a petitioner who “proves by clear and convincing evidence that
he or she has agreed with the biological parent of the child to
conceive and raise the child as co-parents.”137
c. Stepparent Adoption
All states have stepparent adoption processes through
which the spouse of a child’s formal legal parent can adopt the
133 Even among jurisdictions that have adopted statutory language to include
same-sex couples under the ART-based parentage provisions, the language often refers
to any person who consents to a woman’s use of ART, which makes the applicability to
male same-sex couples uncertain. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613(a) (West 2017) (“If a
woman conceives through assisted reproduction with semen or ova or both donated by a
donor not her spouse, with the consent of another intended parent, that intended parent
is treated in law as if he or she were the natural parent of a child thereby conceived.”);
D.C. CODE § 16-909(e)(1) (2017) (“A person who consents to the artificial insemination of
a woman . . . with the intent to be the parent of her child, is conclusively established as
a parent of the resulting child.”); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 1923 (2016) (“[A] person
who consents to assisted reproduction by a woman . . . with the intent to be the parent
of a resulting child is a parent of the resulting child.”); NEV. REV. STAT. § 126.670 (2016)
(“A person who provides gametes for, or consents to assisted reproduction by a woman,
as provided in NRS 126.680, with the intent to be a parent of her child is a parent of the
resulting child.”).
134 See, e.g., JOSLIN ET AL., supra note 74, § 3:4; NAT’L CTR. FOR LESBIAN RIGHTS,
supra note 128, at 1 (“Regardless of whether you are married or in a civil union or
comprehensive domestic partnership, NCLR always encourages non-biological and nonadoptive parents to get an adoption or parentage judgment, even if you are named on
your child’s birth certificate.”).
135 JOSLIN ET AL., supra note 74, § 3:3.
136 Id.
137 Brooke S.B. v. Elizabeth A.C.C., 61 N.E.3d 488, 501 (N.Y. 2016) (“[W]e stress
that this decision addresses only the ability of a person to establish standing as a parent
to petition for custody or visitation . . . .”).
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child without terminating the legal parent’s rights as long as the
child does not already have a second legally recognized parent
or the rights of the second legally recognized parent are
terminated.138 As a result of the nationwide legalization of samesex marriage, married same-sex couples in every state should be
able to avail themselves of stepparent adoption procedures.139
Many states treat stepparent adoptions differently than other
types of adoptions, waiving or authorizing judicial waiver of
requirements for costly and intrusive steps like home studies and
financial accountings for stepparent adoptions.140 This differential
treatment is based on the justification that stepparent adoptions
are distinct because typically the child already will have been
living with the stepparent, and thus the process is simply
formalizing an already existing parent-child relationship and
does not disrupt the child’s living situation.141 In addition, “the
concerns about unlawful payments to birth parents or
intermediaries which are expressed about other types of
adoptions are arguably not present in stepparent adoptions.”142
Even in jurisdictions that waive requirements such as financial
accountings and home studies, the stepparent adoption
procedure can nonetheless be costly and complicated. Many
individuals require the assistance of an attorney to navigate the
process and thus incur attorney’s fees, and the procedure often
requires, inter alia, submitting various documents, paying court
fees, appearing in court, and submitting to a background check.143
138 Mark Strasser, Courts, Legislatures, and Second-Parent Adoptions: On
Judicial Deference, Specious Reasoning, and the Best Interests of the Child, 66 TENN. L.
REV. 1019, 1026 (1999); JOSLIN ET AL., supra note 74, § 5:3.
139 JOSLIN ET AL., supra note 74, § 5:3; NAT’L CTR. FOR LESBIAN RIGHTS, supra
note 128, at 1.
140 UNIF. ADOPTION ACT § 4-111 (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF.
STATE LAWS 1994) (“At present, most States do not require an evaluation or home-study
when a stepparent seeks to adopt a stepchild. Even in States where a home-study is
ostensibly required, the court usually has the discretion to waive the requirement.”);
THOMAS A. JACOBS, CHILDREN AND THE LAW: RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS § 4:5 (2017 ed.)
(“Most states waive the requirement for a homestudy . . . [and] [f]ormal accounting
procedures are generally waived in a stepparent adoption . . . .” (footnote omitted));
Margaret M. Mahoney, Stepparents as Third Parties in Relation to Their Stepchildren,
40 FAM. L.Q. 81, 94 n.51 (2006); W. Bradford Wilcox & Robin Fretwell Wilson, Bringing
Up Baby: Adoption, Marriage, and the Best Interests of the Child, 14 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 883, 885 n.6 (2006).
141 UNIF. ADOPTION ACT § 4 cmt. (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’R ON UNIF.
STATE LAWS 1994).
142 Id.
143 See, e.g., Roe v. Patton, No. 2:15–cv–00253–DB, 2015 WL 4476734, at *2
(C.D. Utah, July 22, 2015) (“To complete a step-parent adoption, [the petitioners] would
have to file a Petition to Adopt a Minor Stepchild in Utah State Court and pay a filing
fee of $360. [The stepparent] would also have to submit to a background check by the
Utah Bureau of Criminal Identification and the Utah Division of Child and Family
Services. Once the adoption petition is submitted, [the petitioners] would have to wait
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2. Second Parent Adoption
Second parent adoption is currently available statewide
in at least thirteen states and the District of Columbia, and is
available in certain counties in at least another fourteen
jurisdictions.144 Second parent adoption is similar to stepparent
adoption in that the partner of a child’s formal legal parent is
able to adopt the child without the formal legal parent’s rights
being terminated, but differs from stepparent adoption in that
unmarried couples can utilize the procedure.145 The first
jurisdictions to grant second parent adoptions did so “in the mid1980s.”146 Since same-sex couples could not marry until recently,
for many years second parent adoption represented the primary
manner through which both members of same-sex couples could
gain recognition as the formal legal parents of the biological
child of one of the partners.147
Like stepparent adoption, second parent adoption
usually requires, inter alia, hiring an attorney, paying court
fees, executing various documents, submitting to background
checks, and appearing in court.148 Notably, however, the second
parent adoption process is often more costly,149 intrusive,150 and

for a judge to schedule a hearing on their adoption petition, and they would then have to
appear in person at the hearing to a get the judge’s approval for [the petitioner] to adopt
[the child]”); see also CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, STEPPARENT ADOPTION 2–4 (2013),
https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubpdfs/f_step.pdf [https://perma.cc/TZB8-TJSV] (providing a
broad overview of stepparent adoption); SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, CTY. OF
SACRAMENTO, STEPPARENT ADOPTION 1–3 (2017), https://www.saccourt.ca.gov/family/docs/flstepparent-adoption.pdf (describing the requirements for a stepparent adoption in
California); Stepparent Adoption is Permanent, OHIO STATE BAR ASS’N (Dec. 22, 2015), https://
www.ohiobar.org/forpublic/resources/lawyoucanuse/pages/lawyoucanuse-204.aspx [https://
perma.cc/A566-E7BC] (describing the Ohio stepparent adoption process).
144 NAT’L CTR. FOR LESBIAN RIGHTS, supra note 128, at 2.
145 Id.; JOSLIN ET AL., supra note 74, § 5:2.
146 Id.
147 Id.
148 See, e.g., STATE OF COLORADO JUDICIAL DEP’T, INSTRUCTIONS FOR SECOND
PARENT ADOPTION, https://www.courts.state.co.us/Forms/PDF/JDF%20495%20Second%
20Parent%20Adoption%20InstructionsR7-17.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y763-UL4B] (providing
instructions for obtaining a second parent adoption in Colorado).
149 For instance, in California the maximum cost of a home study for a second
parent adoption is $700, while “the cost of a home investigation for an independent
adoption is $4,500.” JOSLIN ET AL., supra note 74, § 5:2.
150 Catherine Connolly, The Voice of the Petitioner: The Experiences of Gay and
Lesbian Parents in Successful Second-Parent Adoption Proceedings, 36 L. & SOC’Y REV.
325, 334 (2002) (comparing stepparent adoptions to second parent adoptions and stating
that “[t]he legal process for stepparents to adopt the children of their new spouse is often
much more relaxed and usually does not require a full home study”).
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lengthy151 than the stepparent adoption process.152 For example,
unlike for stepparent adoptions, home studies, which can be
intrusive and costly and can prolong the adoption process, are
generally required for second parent adoptions (although some
states grant courts discretion to waive the home study
requirement).153 Second parent adoptions cost between $2,000
and $3,000 on average154 and, depending on the jurisdiction, can
cost upwards of $5,000.155 Until the adoption process is
completed and the adoption decree is granted, the adopting
parent generally is considered a legal stranger to the child.156
B.

Avenues for Establishing Legal Parent Status That
Generally Have not yet Been Extended to Same-Sex
Parents
1. Formal Avenues for Establishing Legal Parent
Status That Generally Have not yet Been
Extended to Same-Sex Parents
a. Voluntary Acknowledgements of Paternity

The voluntary acknowledgement of paternity (VAP) is
the most common avenue through which unmarried fathers
establish legal paternity of their children.157 A VAP is a
document that identifies a man as a child’s father and is signed
by both the child’s mother and the man identified as the child’s

151 NAT’L CTR. FOR LESBIAN RIGHTS, supra note 128, at 2 (Stepparent “adoptions
have the same effect as a second parent adoption, but they may be faster and less
expensive than second parent adoptions, depending on where you live.”).
152 JOSLIN ET AL., supra note 74, § 5:2; Richard F. Storrow, Rescuing Children
from the Marriage Movement: The Case Against Marital Status Discrimination in
Adoption and Assisted Reproduction, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 305, 343–44 (2006).
153 JOSLIN ET AL., supra note 74, § 5:19; Alexander Newman, Same-Sex
Parenting Among a Patchwork of Laws: An Analysis of New York Same-Sex Parents’
Options for Gaining Legal Parental Status, 2016 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 77, 85 (2016)
(“Stepparent adoptions are often preferable to second-parent adoptions, in part because
they frequently are less costly: second-parent adoptions can require expensive home
studies before the adoption is approved, whereas stepparent adoptions do not.”).
154 How Much Does Adoption Cost?, HUMAN RTS. CAMPAIGN http://www.hrc.org/
resources/how-much-does-adoption-cost [https://perma.cc/2TVF-LRE2].
155 Blake Ellis, Adoption Tax Credit for Same-Sex Couples, CNN MONEY (Feb. 25,
2013, 10:48 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2013/02/25/pf/taxes/same-sex-adoption/ [https://
perma.cc/7N3W-U94V].
156 Nancy D. Polikoff, A Mother Should Not Have to Adopt Her Own Child:
Parentage Laws for Children of Lesbian Couples in the Twenty-first Century, 5 STAN. J.
C.R. & C.L. 201, 207 (2009).
157 Leslie Joan Harris, The New “Illegitimacy”: Revisiting Why Parentage
Should Not Depend on Marriage: Voluntary Acknowledgments of Parentage for SameSex Couples, 20 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 467, 469 (2012).
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father.158 The document establishes legal paternity.159 VAPs are
usually signed at the hospital at the time of birth or shortly
thereafter.160 Under federal law, states must make VAPs
available to unmarried parents in order to receive welfare
funding.161 Consequently, VAPs are available to unmarried
couples in every state.162 Importantly, “[w]hile the federal
legislation contemplated that VAPs would be used simply to
establish paternity, usually for the sake of collecting child
support, empirical evidence indicates that unmarried parents
are using VAPs for another purpose: to identify themselves as a
child’s co-parents and to memorialize that relationship.”163
Federal law mandates that state VAP procedures meet a
number of requirements. For example, all public and private
birthing hospitals as well as birth records offices in the state must
offer VAPs.164 With regard to birthing hospitals specifically, they
“must provide voluntary paternity establishment services focusing
on the period immediately before and after the birth of a child born
out-of-wedlock.”165 In addition, birthing hospitals and birth records
offices must have staff trained to advise unmarried parents
regarding VAPs,166 and “each party must be given oral and written
notice of the alternatives to, legal consequences of, and rights and
responsibilities arising from the signed acknowledgment.”167 The
state cannot require a man to submit to genetic testing before
signing a VAP, although in some states either the VAP or the
accompanying instructions indicate that only biological fathers
should sign.168 Either the mother or the putative father may
rescind the VAP until either sixty days have passed or there has
been “an administrative or judicial proceeding relating to the

Id. at 475.
Id.; see also DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERV., OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., OFF.
OF EVALUATIONS AND INSPECTIONS, OEI-06-98-00053, PATERNITY ESTABLISHMENT: USE
OF VOLUNTARY PATERNITY ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 1 (2000), https://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/
oei-06-98-00053.pdf [https://perma.cc/HLJ8-3S8G] [hereinafter OFFICE OF THE
INSPECTOR GENERAL].
160 Child Support 101.2: Establishing Paternity, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGIS.,
(Mar. 19, 2014), http://www.ncsl.org/research/human-services/enforcement-establishingpaternity.aspx [https://perma.cc/49ZU-VSMN] [hereinafter Child Support 101.2] (“Most
often, voluntary paternity acknowledgment is completed in the hospital within days of
the child’s birth.”); Harris, supra note 157, at 476 n.36.
161 Harris, supra note 157, at 475.
162 Id.; see also OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, supra note 159, at i.
163 Harris, supra note 157, at 476–77.
164 45 C.F.R. §§ 303.5(g)(1)(i), (ii) (2016); Harris, supra note 157, at 476.
165 45 C.F.R. § 303.5(g)(1)(i).
166 Child Support 101.2., supra note 160.
167 Harris, supra note 157, at 476 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(5)(C)(i) (2012)); see
also 45 C.F.R. § 303.5(g)(2)(i);; OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, supra note 159, at 1.
168 Feinberg, supra note 1, at 343–44.
158

159
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child,” whichever is earlier.169 Importantly, a VAP that is not
rescinded within sixty days, must be “considered a legal finding
of paternity.”170 Moreover, states must give full faith and credit
to out-of-state VAPs that comply with federal law and the law of
the issuing state.171
After sixty days have passed, VAPs “can only be
challenged on the grounds of fraud, duress, or material mistake
of fact.”172 The most frequent challenges to VAPs following the
sixty-day rescission period involve claims that the man
identified in the VAP is not the child’s biological father and
allegations of either fraudulent conduct by the mother in
misleading the father or mistake of material fact.173 Most states
that have ruled on the issue have allowed challenges to VAPs
based upon DNA testing, though test results indicating that the
man identified in the VAP is not the child’s biological factor do
not always result in rescission of the VAP.174 For example, courts
in some states require evidence of fraud or mistake beyond the
test results, allow for rescission on this basis only if it is in the
best interests of the child, or use theories of equitable estoppel
to prevent rescission on this basis in certain situations.175
Although at least one scholar has set forth a
comprehensive proposal to expand the use of VAPs to same-sex
parents, to date same-sex parents generally have not been able
to utilize VAPs to establish legal parent status.176 Due to the fact
that in situations involving same-sex parents the parent
identified in the VAP would often lack genetic ties to the child,
VAP procedures across the United States would need to be
restructured so that representations regarding genetic ties were
not a part of the execution process and genetics-based claims
could not be grounds for rescission. In addition, standards likely
would need to be set forth regarding the applicable procedure to
be followed when the child’s second biological parent is not a
member of the couple seeking to execute the VAP, but is known
to the couple.177 The lack of availability of VAPs to same-sex
couples further reflects the substantial differences that continue
to exist with regard to the ease with which different- and same169

159, at 1.
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177

42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(5)(D)(ii); OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, supra note
42 U.S.C. § 666 (a)(5)(D)(ii), (E).
Harris, supra note 157, at 476.
Id.
Id. at 479.
Id. at 479–80.
Id. at 480.
See generally Harris, supra note 157.
Id. at 487.
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sex couples are able to establish both members of the couple as
the formal legal parents of their children.
b. Procedures That Establish Legal Paternity for
Unmarried Men Based upon Biology
In addition to VAPs, other avenues exist to establish the
legal paternity of unmarried men. In situations in which
paternity establishment has not been completed through a VAP,
interested parties, such as the mother, the putative father, or a
child support agency, commonly pursue legal proceedings to
establish the putative father’s paternity. Establishing a putative
father’s paternity through legal proceedings generally involves
genetic testing demonstrating that the putative father is the
child’s biological father.178 Notably, federal law governing child
support requires that all states adopt:
[p]rocedures under which the State is required, in a contested paternity
case (unless otherwise barred by State law) to require the child and all other
parties . . . to submit to genetic tests upon the request of any such party, if
the request is supported by a sworn statement by the party . . . alleging
paternity, and setting forth facts establishing a reasonable possibility of the
requisite sexual contact between the parties; or . . . denying paternity, and
setting forth facts establishing a reasonable possibility of the nonexistence
of sexual contact between the parties.179

Furthermore, federal child support law also requires states to
adopt standards that create a conclusive or rebuttable
presumption of paternity based upon genetic testing results
demonstrating that the putative father is the child’s biological
father.180 Due to the genetics-based nature of establishing
paternity through these legal proceedings and the reality that in
same-sex relationships it is usually the nonbiological parent who
lacks legal parent status, this avenue of establishing legal
parent status generally is unavailable to same-sex couples.

178 Marilyn Ray Smith & Paula M. Carey, Paternity Challenges to Children
Born During a Marriage, in PATERNITY AND THE LAW OF PARENTAGE IN MASSACHUSETTS
§ 8.1 (2d ed. 2009) (“Contested [paternity] matters usually involve compelling the
putative father to submit to genetic tests . . . .”).
179 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(5)(B)(i) (2012).
180 Id. at § 666(a)(5)(G).

86

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83:1

2. Function-Based Avenues for Establishing Legal
Parent Status That Generally Have not yet Been
Extended to Same-Sex Parents: “Holding Out”
Presumptions
A number of states have statutory provisions that set
forth “holding out” presumptions.181 Holding out presumptions
can be traced to a 1973 Uniform Parentage Act (UPA) provision
which stated that a man is entitled to a presumption of paternity
if “while the child is under the age of majority, he receives the
child into his home and openly holds out the child as his natural
child.”182 While a number of states continue to employ holding
out presumptions that contain language similar to that of the
1973 UPA, nine states have adopted variations of the holding
out provision set forth in the 2002 UPA, which “has a durational
requirement, providing that the person must have lived with
and held out the child [ ] as his own for the first two years of the
child’s life.”183 Because the language of holding out presumptions
generally requires that an individual hold the child out as his
“natural” or “own” child, the applicability of these provisions to
a nonbiological parent in a same-sex relationship with the child’s
biological parent is uncertain.184
In 2005, the Supreme Court of California held that the
state’s holding out presumption, which provided a presumption
of paternity to a man who “receives the child into his home and
openly holds out the child as his natural child,” applied to a
woman in a same-sex relationship with the child’s biological
mother.185 The California legislature recently amended the holding
out presumption to make it gender neutral.186 This avenue for
establishing legal parent status, however, is one of the newer
avenues, and to date very few court decisions in other jurisdictions
have ruled on the applicability of holding out presumptions to

JOSLIN ET AL., supra note 74, § 5:22.
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 4(a)(4) (1973).
183 JOSLIN ET AL., supra note 74, § 5:22.
184 NeJaime, supra note 132, at 1215–16 (“The UPA’s ‘holding out’ provision,
section 7611(d), was designed for unmarried, biological fathers. It provided that one is a
presumed father if ‘he receives the child into his home and openly holds out the child as
his natural child.’ While the provision focused on unmarried fathers’ parental conduct,
it seemed—with the term ‘natural’—constrained by biology.” (emphasis in original)
(quoting CAL. FAM. CODE § 7611(d) (West 2014))).
185 See Elisa B. v. Superior Court, 117 P.3d 660, 664, 670, 672 (Cal. 2005)
(quoting CAL. FAM. CODE § 7611(d) (West 2014)).
186 NeJaime, supra note 132, at 1261.
181

182
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same-sex parents.187 Like the equitable parenthood doctrines
discussed above, this avenue for establishing parental rights is not
available immediately at the time of birth and requires the
petitioner to prove that he or she engaged in certain conduct
relating to the child.188
III.

EVALUATING THE CURRENT NEED FOR CONTINUED
LEGAL RECOGNITION OF EQUITABLE PARENTHOOD
DOCTRINES

In cases involving same-sex parents, even though it
remains far more difficult for same-sex couples to establish both
members as formal legal parents as compared to their differentsex counterparts, it will be tempting for judges to refuse to apply
equitable parenthood doctrines on the grounds that there were
avenues available through which the functional parent could
have obtained formal legal parent status, and thus equity does
not require application of the doctrine.189 This will likely be
especially true in jurisdictions in which the establishment of
formal legal parent status for functional parents in same-sex
relationships is available through various marriage-based
avenues, second parent adoption, or a combination of these
avenues.190 In addition, in jurisdictions that provide same-sex
couples with various marriage- or adoption-based avenues
through which the functional parent can obtain formal legal
parent status, opponents of equitable parenthood doctrines likely
will argue that the failure of the couple to pursue these avenues
demonstrates a lack of consent on the part of the formal legal
parent to the functional parent forming a parent-like relationship
with the child, and that application of an equitable parenthood
187 JOSLIN ET AL., supra note 74, § 5:22. The Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts recently held that the state’s holding-out presumption applies to samesex couples. Partanen v. Gallagher, 59 N.E.3d 1133, 1142 (Mass. 2016).
188 See supra Section I.B.
189 See, e.g., A.H. v. M.P., 857 N.E.2d 1061, 1073–74 (Mass. 2006); Debra H. v.
Janice R., 930 N.E.2d 184, 193 (N.Y. 2010) (citing the availability of second parent
adoption in support of decision declining to apply an equitable parenthood doctrine),
abrogated by Brooke S.B. v. Elizabeth A.C.C., 61 N.E.3d 488 (N.Y. 2016); Titchenal v.
Dexter, 693 A.2d 682, 689 (Vt. 1997); NeJaime, supra note 132, at 1252 (“Courts that
may otherwise have used equitable theories to recognize such parents may find that for
nonbiological parents who had the opportunity to legally marry a child’s biological
parent, their choice not to do so undermines their claim to parental rights.”); Nancy
Polikoff, The New “Illegitimacy”: Winning Backward in the Protection of the Children of
Lesbian Couples, 20 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 721, 728 (2012) (“The existence of
marriage—or an equivalent formal status—makes it easier to implement bright line
rules about legal consequences. This ease means that judges and legislators, satisfied
that marriage is a good enough dividing line, will be less likely to engage in the messier
business of achieving justice.”).
190 See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
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doctrine is therefore inappropriate.191 These arguments, however,
are ultimately unpersuasive, and it would be a mistake for courts
and legislatures to decline to apply or establish equitable
parenthood doctrines on the grounds that marriage or adoptionbased avenues to establishing legal parent status for functional
parents in same-sex relationships exist in the jurisdiction.
This Part will proceed as follows: it first addresses the
implications for same-sex parents of courts and legislatures
declining to adopt or apply equitable parenthood doctrines based
upon the availability of marriage-based avenues to establishing
formal legal parent status in the relevant jurisdiction. It then
addresses the implications for same-sex parents of courts and
legislatures declining to adopt or apply equitable parenthood
doctrines due to the availability of second parent adoption as an
avenue to establishing formal legal parent status in the relevant
jurisdiction. Finally, the Part concludes by exploring whether
declining to apply equitable parenthood doctrines on the basis of
the availability to same-sex couples of marriage- and adoptionbased avenues of establishing formal legal parent status will
further the best interests of children.
A.

The Preclusion of Equitable Parenthood Doctrines Based
Upon Current Avenues for Establishing Legal Parent
Status for Same-Sex Parents That Require Marriage
1. Marriage-Based Presumptions of Parentage

With regard to the question of whether the extension of
marriage-based presumptions of parentage to married same-sex
couples should preclude application of equitable parenthood
doctrines, it is important to note at the outset that most
jurisdictions have not ruled on whether their existing marriagebased presumptions of parentage actually extend to married
same-sex couples.192 Moreover, those jurisdictions that have
ruled on the issue have not all reached the same result.193
Importantly, even in jurisdictions that have extended marriagebased presumptions of parentage to married same-sex couples,
because such presumptions typically remain gendered in that
they have as their starting point a woman who gives birth to or
conceives a child while married, it is far from clear that the
extensions encompass male same-sex couples.194 Indeed, the
191
192
193
194

See supra notes 115–116 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 126–127 and accompanying text.
See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
Appleton, supra note 126, at 260–65.
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court decisions extending marriage-based presumptions of
parentage to same-sex couples have arisen in the context of
female same-sex couples.195 Thus, abandoning equitable
parenthood doctrines based upon statutes or judicial decisions
that on their face extend marriage-based presumptions of
parentage to same-sex couples but do not explicitly address the
application of such presumptions to male same-sex couples, would
be deeply unfair to male same-sex couples. Even for female samesex couples, however, the availability of marriage-based
presumptions of parentage should not exclude application of
equitable parenthood doctrines. The potential arguments in favor
of requiring a formal legal parent and a functional parent to
marry in order for the functional parent to obtain legal
recognition of his or her relationship with the couple’s child are
unpersuasive, and this type of approach to establishing the rights
of same-sex parents is both discriminatory and deeply flawed.
Potential arguments for excluding equitable parenthood
doctrines based upon the availability to same-sex couples of
marriage-based presumptions of parentage likely will arise from
the underlying idea that marriage to a child’s formal legal
parent is a superior basis for establishing parental rights
because the decision to marry is uniquely reflective or predictive
of certain spousal understandings and conduct relating to
children born or conceived during the marriage.196 For example,
one possibility is that the decision to marry signifies an
individual’s consent to her spouse serving as a parent to any
child born to or conceived by that individual during the
marriage.197 A related possibility is that the decision to marry
demonstrates an individual’s willingness to assume the
obligations of parenthood for any child born to or conceived by
his or her spouse during the marriage.198 Another possibility rests
on an assumption that a married individual will form a
meaningful parent-child bond with any child born to or conceived

See id. at 265.
See supra notes 193–195 and accompanying text; infra notes 197–199 and
accompanying text.
197 See Joanna L. Grossman, Parentage Without Gender, 17 CARDOZO J.
CONFLICT RESOL. 717, 740 (2016) (“Second, the biological mother’s consent to marry is
sometimes treated as consent to share parental rights of any children born during the
union. Recall the ruling in Debra H., in which the New York Court of Appeals held that
marriage to a child’s mother is the only way other than adoption through which a lesbian
co-parent can gain parental status. The court based its ruling squarely on the notion of
consent. While Janice M., the biological mother, had the power to exclude other adults
from her child’s life, she gave up that power by entering into a civil union with Debra H.
while pregnant and inviting her to assume a parental role.” (footnote omitted)).
198 NeJaime, supra note 132, at 1242.
195
196
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by his or her spouse during the marriage.199 These arguments for
requiring same-sex parents to marry in order for the functional
parent to receive legal recognition of his or her relationship with
the couple’s child, however, are ultimately unpersuasive.
There are many reasons for why couples choose to remain
unmarried, and a decision to remain unmarried may say nothing
about whether the formal legal parent has consented to the
functional parent serving as a parent to the child, the functional
parent has assumed the obligations of parenthood, or a
meaningful parent-child bond exists between the child and
functional parent.200 Couples may remain unmarried for many
reasons, including, inter alia, that they do not feel that they are
in a stable enough economic position to marry;201 they wish to
avoid the financial consequences accompanying marriage;202
they are opposed to marriage due to its patriarchal, racist, and
discriminatory history and the related societal expectations that
still often accompany marriage;203 or they simply prefer to exist
in a relationship that does not include the state as a member.204
Marriage is simply an ineffective proxy for the determination of
questions relating to the formal legal parent’s consent, the
functional parent’s assumption of parental obligations, or the
formation of meaningful parent-child bonds between the child
and functional parent. Importantly, instead of using an imprecise
proxy such as marriage to determine these important questions
relating to consent, the assumption of parental obligations, and
the formation of meaningful parent-child bonds, the common
elements of the equitable parenthood doctrines actually require
courts to directly investigate and answer these questions.205
See Grossman, supra note 197, at 739–40.
See infra notes 201–204.
201 Meg Murphy, NowUKnow: Why Millennials Refuse to Get Married, BENTLEY
U.,
http://www.bentley.edu/impact/articles/nowuknow-why-millennials-refuse-getmarried [https://perma.cc/S25X-T2BK]; Wendy Wang & Kim Parker, Record Share of
Americans Have Never Married: As Values, Economics, and Gender Patterns Change,
PEW RES. CTR., (Sept. 24, 2014), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2014/09/24/recordshare-of-americans-have-never-married/ [https://perma.cc/NT9X-57XR] (“For young
adults who want to get married, financial security is a significant hurdle. Compared with
their older counterparts, young adults who have never been married are more likely to
cite financial security as the main reason for not being currently married.”).
202 Marriage
v. Cohabitation, FINDLAW, http://family.findlaw.com/livingtogether/marriage-vs-cohabitation.html [https://perma.cc/74M5-42PW].
203 Jessica R. Feinberg, The Survival of Nonmarital Relationship Statuses in
the Same-Sex Marriage Era: A Proposal, 87 TEMP. L. REV. 45, 61–62 (2014).
204 Keith Ablow, Let’s Make a New Way to Get Married and Get the State Out of
the Matrimony Business, FOX NEWS (Dec. 21, 2011), http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/
2011/12/21/lets-make-new-way-to-get-married-and-get-state-out-matrimonybusiness.html [https://perma.cc/C63P-ELJ7].
205 See Grossman, supra note 8, at 719–20 (“The partner’s functional role in
parent-like activities over a period of time—particularly if the partner was involved in
199

200
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Moreover, excluding equitable parenthood doctrines
based upon the availability to same-sex couples of marriagebased presumptions of parentage, and essentially requiring
same-sex parents to marry in order for the functional parent to
receive parental rights, is discriminatory against same-sex
couples and their children. As discussed above, different-sex
couples do not need to marry in order for both members to
receive parental rights—a variety of avenues to establishing
formal legal parent status are available to unmarried differentsex parents.206 The law recognizes the value of the relationships
between unmarried different-sex parents and their children and
the importance of providing children with two legally recognized
parents. In fact, the establishment of formal legal parent status
for unmarried different-sex parents has become an essential
goal of family law, and consequently the law provides
straightforward and uncomplicated procedures for unmarried
different-sex parents to obtain formal legal parent status.207
Any argument that attempts to justify requiring only
same-sex couples to marry in order to receive parental rights by
pointing to the greater likelihood that both members of a
different-sex couple are biologically related to their child, is
unconvincing. Jurisdictions that have extended marriage-based
presumptions of parentage to same-sex couples necessarily
recognize that biological connections should not be a
prerequisite to receiving parental rights, and that children of
same-sex parents, like children of different-sex parents, benefit
significantly from having two legally recognized parents.
Furthermore, the most common avenue for establishing parental
rights for unmarried men in different-sex relationships, the VAP,
by law does not require proof of a biological connection between
the child and the man identified through the VAP as the father.208
Excluding equitable parenthood doctrines based upon the
availability to same-sex couples of marriage-based presumptions
of parentage and requiring same-sex parents to marry in order
for both parents to receive parental rights is unjustifiable
discrimination against same-sex couples and their children.
There are also significant class- and race-based
implications of declining to apply equitable parenthood doctrines
on the basis of the availability to same-sex couples of marriagethe decision to conceive a child in the first place—would seem a much better indicator of
consent to share the role of parent than whether the couple said vows to each other at
some point.”).
206 See supra Section II.B.
207 See supra Section II.B.
208 See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
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based presumptions of parentage. Today, “[m]arriage itself has
become a marker of privilege [and] [t]hose who marry . . . are
more likely to be white, relatively educated, and relatively highincome.”209 Consequently, denying rights to functional parents
based solely on their decision to remain unmarried would
disproportionately harm less privileged parents. Moreover,
same-sex couples that include at least one member who is
African American or Latino are more likely to be raising children
than same-sex couples in which both members are white, and
the average income of same-sex couples raising children is
substantially lower than the average income of same-sex couples
as a broader population.210 As a result, “if trends regarding
marriage . . . by same-sex couples follow more general trends,
the members of the LGB community who are statistically most
likely to be raising children are also statistically least likely to
marry . . . .”211 This demonstrates the necessity of maintaining
equitable parenthood doctrines to protect parents raising
children within same-sex relationships regardless of the
extension to same-sex couples of marriage-based avenues to
establishing formal legal parent status.
2. Stepparent Adoption
In jurisdictions that do not extend marital presumptions
of parentage to married same-sex couples, courts may
nonetheless decline to adopt or apply equitable parenthood
doctrines on the basis that equity does not require the
application of such doctrines because the nonbiological parent
could have undertaken a stepparent adoption in order to obtain
formal legal parent status. As an initial matter, an individual
who wishes to undertake a stepparent adoption must first marry
the child’s formal legal parent.212 Although same-sex marriage is
now available in every U.S. jurisdiction, for the reasons
discussed in the previous subsection, the availability to samesex couples of avenues for establishing formal legal parent
status that require marriage should not preclude recognition of
equitable parenthood doctrines.213 Moreover, there are a number
of additional compelling reasons for why the availability to

NeJaime, supra note 132, at 1250 (footnote omitted).
Deborah A. Widiss, Non-Marital Families and (or After?) Marriage Equality,
42 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 547, 568 (2015).
211 Id. (emphasis in original).
212 See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
213 See supra Section III.A.1.
209
210
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same-sex couples of stepparent adoption should not lead courts
to decline to adopt or apply equitable parenthood doctrines.
As detailed above, stepparent adoption is a substantial
undertaking.214 Even in jurisdictions that waive some of the
more intrusive and time-consuming requirements such as
financial accountings and home studies, the procedure can
nonetheless be costly and complicated.215 Many individuals
require the assistance of an attorney to navigate the process and
consequently incur attorney’s fees, and the procedure often
requires, inter alia, filing a number of documents, paying court
fees, appearing in court, and submitting to a background check.216
Requiring stepparent adoption in addition to marriage in order
for nonbiological parents raising children within same-sex
relationships to obtain parental rights would disproportionately
harm low-income same-sex parents and their children, and would
further exacerbate the differences in the cost and difficulty of
obtaining parental rights for same- and different-sex parents.217
Consequently, the arguments against precluding recognition of
equitable parenthood doctrines based upon the availability of
stepparent adoption are even more compelling than the
arguments against precluding recognition of equitable
parenthood doctrines based upon the availability of marriagebased presumptions of parentage.
B.

The Preclusion of Equitable Parenthood Doctrines Based
Upon the Availability of Second Parent Adoption

As an initial matter, second parent adoption, in which the
non-marital partner of a child’s formal legal parent is able to
adopt the child without the formal legal parent’s rights being
terminated, is not available in all jurisdictions.218 For the
reasons discussed in the previous subsections, the need for
equitable parenthood doctrines is clear in jurisdictions in which
marriage provides the only avenue through which nonbiological
parents raising children within same-sex relationships can
obtain parental rights.219 In jurisdictions that do recognize
second parent adoption, it will be tempting for courts and
legislatures to decline to adopt or apply equitable parenthood
See supra Section II.A.3.a.
See supra note 143.
216 See supra note 143.
217 This is because different-sex parents are able to obtain parental rights
through avenues that require neither marriage nor adoption. See supra Section II.B.
218 See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
219 See supra Sections III.A.1–2.
214
215
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doctrines on the grounds that equity does not require the
application of such doctrines because the individual who is now
seeking parental rights could have obtained formal legal parent
status through second parent adoption. In fact, a few courts have
already used the availability of second parent adoption
procedures in their jurisdictions in support of decisions declining
to adopt or apply equitable parenthood doctrines.220 Although a
decision to pursue second parent adoption arguably addresses
questions of the legal parent’s consent to the formation of a
parent-child relationship between the functional parent and the
child and the functional parent’s assumption of the obligations of
parenthood more directly than a decision to marry, it nonetheless
would be both unwise and unfair for courts and legislatures to
refuse to apply or adopt equitable parenthood doctrines on the
basis of the availability of second parent adoption.
Second parent adoption is a complicated process that
requires substantial resources, and the failure to undertake a
second parent adoption may have nothing to do with whether
the legal parent has consented to the formation of parent-child
relationship between the child and functional parent or whether
the functional parent has assumed the obligations of
parenthood.221 Like stepparent adoption, second parent adoption
usually requires, inter alia, hiring an attorney, paying court
fees, executing various documents, submitting to background
checks, and appearing in court.222 Moreover, as discussed above,
the second parent adoption process is often even more costly,
intrusive, and/or lengthy than the stepparent adoption
process.223 For example, unlike for stepparent adoptions, home
studies, which can be both intrusive and costly and can prolong
the adoption process, are generally required for second parent
adoptions (although some states grant courts discretion to waive
the home study requirement).224 Second parent adoptions cost

See supra note 120.
Polikoff, supra note 189, at 733–34 (“There are numerous reasons why
couples do not go this route. It is time consuming and expensive, it requires a lawyer, it
subjects the family to court scrutiny, and it cannot start until after the child’s birth,
leaving the relationship unrecognized for months or longer until a final adoption decree
is signed. Couples may be unfamiliar with such procedures, may lack resources to pursue
them, and may not understand the ramifications of not completing them.”).
222 See supra notes 140, 148 and accompanying text.
223 See supra notes 152–153.
224 JOSLIN ET AL., supra note 74, § 5:19; Newman, supra note 153, at 85.
(“Stepparent adoptions are often preferable to second-parent adoptions, in part because
they frequently are less costly: second-parent adoptions can require expensive home
studies before the adoption is approved, whereas stepparent adoptions do not.”).
220

221

2017]

WHITHER THE FUNCTIONAL PARENT

95

between $2,000 and $3,000 on average,225 and, depending on the
jurisdiction, can cost upwards of $5,000.226
Overall, as Nancy Polikoff has explained, the second
parent adoption process “is time consuming and expensive, it
requires a lawyer, it subjects the family to court scrutiny, and
. . . [c]ouples may be unfamiliar with such procedures, may lack
resources to pursue them, and may not understand the
ramifications of not completing them.”227 A couple’s failure to
undergo the second parent adoption process is clearly an
ineffective proxy for a lack of consent on the part of the formal
legal parent or a lack of the assumption of the obligations of
parenthood on behalf of the functional parent, and thus it should
not preclude application of the equitable parenthood doctrines.
Importantly, the common elements of the equitable parenthood
doctrines directly address the questions of the legal parent’s
consent and the functional parent’s assumption of the
obligations of parenthood.228 Thus, it is within the application of
the equitable parenthood doctrines that courts can most
effectively analyze the issues of the formal parent’s consent and
the functional parent’s assumption of parental obligations,
including whether the failure to obtain a second parent adoption
was in any way related to these issues.229 Finally, just like
excluding equitable parenthood doctrines due to the availability
of marriage-based avenues for establishing formal legal parent
status would disproportionately harm same-sex couples and
their children, so too would excluding equitable parenthood
doctrines on the basis of the availability of second parent
adoption. This is because unlike same-sex couples, different-sex
couples have access to a variety of avenues to establishing
parental rights that require neither adoption nor marriage.230

HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, supra note 154.
Ellis, supra note 155.
227 Polikoff, supra note 189, at 733–34.
228 See supra Section I.B.
229 This is the approach taken by the ALI Principles with regard to its “parent by
estoppel” doctrine. The comment accompanying the doctrine indicates that the failure to
adopt should not preclude application of the doctrine, but may be relevant to the question of
agreement between the parties to co-parent. ALI PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY
DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.03 cmt. b.(iii) (AM. LAW INST. 2002).
230 See supra Section II.B.
225
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The Effects on the Best Interests of Children if Equitable
Parenthood Doctrines are Eschewed Based on the
Availability to Same-Sex Couples of Marriage- and
Adoption-Based Avenues to Establishing Formal Legal
Parent Status

As discussed in the previous two subsections, there exist
many compelling reasons for maintaining equitable parenthood
doctrines even when marriage- and adoption-based avenues of
establishing formal legal parent status are available to same-sex
couples. What is perhaps the most compelling reason, however, is
that eschewing equitable parenthood doctrines due to the
availability of marriage and adoption-based avenues for establishing
formal legal parent status does not further the best interests of
children. An approach that determines parental rights based
exclusively upon formal steps such as marrying a child’s formal legal
parent or undertaking an adoption, and categorically refuses to
provide rights to informal parents regardless of the degree to which
they have functioned as a child’s parent, is an approach that runs
counter to the promotion of children’s best interests.231 As scholar
Carlos Ball has correctly noted,
[O]ver- and under-inclusivity results from the application of a rule that uses
the existence of biological or adoptive links between the adult and the child,
or of a legal relationship between the two adults, as a necessary pre-condition
for the granting of parentage status. The rule is overinclusive because it
affords legal protections to children even in circumstances in which the adults
in question play no meaningful roles in their lives. And it is underinclusive
because it denies protections to children who have established parent-child
bonds with individuals who are unable to meet the courts’ bright-line rules
aimed at promoting certainty.232

A significant body of research indicates that children
form strong bonds with parental figures regardless of the existence
of biological or adoptive ties.233 Disrupting relationships between
231 J. Herbie DiFonzo & Ruth C. Stern, Breaking the Mold and Picking up the
Pieces: Rights of Parenthood and Parentage in Nontraditional Families, 51 FAM. CT. REV.
104, 108 (2013) (“[T]he insistence that same-sex partners follow specific and lengthy
legal procedures in order to verify their right to parent the children they view as their
own will ultimately hurt the children of these families. These children will be ripped
from a relationship with one of the parents who was raising them . . . .”).
232 Carlos Ball, Rendering Children Illegitimate in Former Partner Parenting
Cases: Hiding Behind the Facade of Certainty, 20 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 623,
667 (2012).
233 See supra notes 53–71 and accompanying text; see also Ball, supra note 232,
at 666 (“Most children understand, from a very young age, who their parents are. Indeed,
that understanding is in place well before they comprehend the legal implications of
biological and adoptive links. Young children, therefore, do not make distinctions
between their legal and non-legal parents.”).
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children and the individuals who they view as parents can have
significantly harmful short- and long-term effects on children.234 It
is unfair to punish children due to the failure or inability of their
parents to take the steps necessary to obtain formal legal parent
status for the functional parent.235 Precluding the recognition of
equitable parenthood doctrines based upon the availability to
same-sex parents of marriage- and adoption-based avenues to
establishing formal legal parent status, means there will be
more children who, “through no fault of their own, miss out on
the legal, financial, and emotional benefits of having a second
parent.”236 As one judge stated, in these situations, “[t]he child is
helpless with the most to lose.”237 Moreover, since there is a
positive correlation between income level and marriage rates
and the adoption process requires substantial resources, it is the
already disadvantaged children of lower-income parents who
will most often be denied the substantial benefits of maintaining
a relationship with an individual who has functioned as their
parent and with whom they have formed a parent-child bond.238
IV.

THE FUTURE OF EQUITABLE PARENTHOOD DOCTRINES

A.

The Continuing Need for Equitable Parenthood
Doctrines Even if Same-Sex Couples Receive Greater
Access to the Avenues of Obtaining Formal Legal Parent
Status Available to Different-Sex Couples

It is possible that in the future, methods of establishing
formal legal parent status that require neither marriage nor
adoption will be extended to same-sex parents. For example,
perhaps states will extend the use of VAPs to same-sex couples
or more states will enact statutes that extend formal legal
parent status to an individual who consents to a partner’s use of
ART with the intent to parent the child, regardless of marital
status or gender. If it becomes easier for members of same-sex
couples to obtain formal legal parent status in efficient, low-cost
manners, the argument that equity requires the provision of
See supra notes 53–71 and accompanying text.
Polikoff, supra note 189, at 723 (“[C]hildren should not suffer because their
parents do not marry.”).
236 Ball, supra note 232, at 663.
237 Chatterjee v. King, 253 P.3d 915, 929 (N.M. Ct. App. 2010) (Vigil, J., dissenting).
238 See supra notes 209, 225–226 and accompanying text; see also Michael
Greenstone & Allen Looney, The Marriage Gap: The Impact of Economic & Technological
Change on Marriage Rates, BROOKINGS (Feb. 3, 2012), https://www.brookings.edu/
blog/jobs/2012/02/03/the-marriage-gap-the-impact-of-economic-and-technologicalchange-on-marriage-rates/ [https://perma.cc/43LJ-JEHS].
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parental rights to functional parents will weaken. Moreover, in
disputes between formal legal parents and functional parents, the
increased availability to same-sex couples of straightforward, lostcost avenues of establishing formal legal parent status will
strengthen the argument that the formal legal parent did not
actually consent to the functional parent forming a parent-like
relationship with the child. In fact, in such situations the formal
legal parent will likely argue that the couple’s failure to pursue
available efficient, low-cost manners of establishing formal legal
parent status for the functional parent directly reflects a lack of
consent on the part of the formal legal parent to the functional
parent forming a parent-like relationship with the child, and thus
that application of equitable parenthood doctrines is inappropriate.
Even in a potential future where the more efficient, lowcost avenues to establishing legal parent status are available to
same-sex parents, however, there will continue to be some
situations in which equity requires the application of equitable
parenthood doctrines. As an initial matter, the more efficient,
low-cost avenues to establishing legal parent status such as
VAPs and consent to a partner’s use of ART239 generally will be
of little help to a functional parent who enters the lives of the
legal parent and his or her child at some point after the child is
born.240 For these individuals, adoption, which in some
jurisdictions requires marriage as a prerequisite, may be the
only option available for obtaining formal legal parent status. As
discussed in detail above, there are many reasons for why a
couple may not pursue adoption.241 These reasons may have
nothing to do with the legal parent’s consent, the functional
parent’s assumption of parental obligations, or the bond between
the child and functional parent, and thus equitable parenthood
doctrines serve an essential function even when adoption is
available in the jurisdiction.242 Moreover, even functional
parents who pursue adoption lack formal recognition as legal
parents until the lengthy adoption process is completed, and
239 It is important to note, however, that for couples who would like to use ART
without the involvement of a physician, the consent to a spouse’s use of an ART avenue
would not qualify as a low-cost or efficient option if the governing statute required, as a
number currently do, that the procedure be performed by or under the supervision of a
physician. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
240 While VAPs can be signed following discharge from the hospital, most are
signed in the hospital or birthing center because that is where these documents are
presented to the birth parent. See supra notes 160–164 and accompanying text. In
addition, the language of many VAPs instructs that only men who believe that they are
the child’s biological father should sign, and thus it would not be applicable to a parent
who entered the picture after the child’s birth. See supra note 168.
241 See supra Section III.B.
242 See infra Section IV.B.
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therefore such parents may require the protection provided by
equitable parenthood doctrines.243
Another reason that equitable parenthood doctrines
should remain—even if there is an expansion to same-sex
couples of more efficient, low-cost avenues to establishing formal
legal parent status—is that there have been situations where
legal parents have, by their words and actions, consented to and
encouraged the formation of a parent-like relationship between
the functional parent and child, but who have used manipulation
to obstruct the functional parent from establishing formal legal
parent status.244 For example, in the case of Debra H. v. Janice
R., according to the court, the nonbiological parent, Debra,
“served as a loving and caring parental figure during the first
[two and a half] years of the child’s life,” until she and the child’s
biological mother, Janice, separated.245 At first, Janice allowed
Debra to see the child multiple times each week and to speak
with the child over the phone each day, but Janice subsequently
limited the amount of time Debra spent with the child and
eventually terminated all communication between Debra and
the child.246 According to Debra, who had not obtained a second
parent adoption even though second parent adoption was
available in the jurisdiction, Janice had convinced Debra that
they did not need to pursue this formal means of establishing
legal parent status, stating “We don’t need an adoption. You are
his parent. I’m a lawyer. I know the court system. We don’t want
the courts to get involved . . . .”247 Debra also claimed Janice told
Debra that she “would never take [the child] away from her.”248
While manipulating a functional parent in this manner will be
more difficult if a variety of efficient, low-cost avenues to
obtaining parenthood for same-sex couples are available, it will
still be possible. This will be particularly true in situations
where the functional parent enters the picture sometime after
See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
See Grossman, supra note 8, at 703–04 (explaining that without the
equitable parenthood doctrines, “the biological mother alone can decide whether to
permit her female partner to adopt, whether to enter into a marriage or civil union that
might result in joint parentage, or whether to consent to shared custody or visitation
after a break-up. Yet the couple’s decision as to which partner will bear the child may
rest on considerations—such as fertility, age, and health—that have nothing to do with
which of the two would be a better parent, let alone the only parent.” (emphasis in
original)).
245 Debra H. v. Janice R., 877 N.Y.S.2d 259, 260 (App. Div. 2009), rev’d 930 N.E.2d
184 (N.Y. 2010), abrogated by Brooke S.B. v. Elizabeth A.C.C., 61 N.E.3d 488 (N.Y. 2016).
246 Debra H., 930 N.E.2d at 186.
247 Verified Petition at ¶ 31, Debra H. v. Janice R., No. 106569/08, 2008 WL 7675822
(N.Y. Sup. Oct. 2, 2008) (No. 0810656908), 2008 WL 7471048 (emphasis in original).
248 Debra H., 2008 WL 7675822, at *4.
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the child’s birth when efficient, low-cost avenues to obtaining
legal parent status are less likely to be available.249
Additional reasons for maintaining equitable parenthood
doctrines despite the expansion to same-sex couples of more
efficient, low-cost avenues to establishing formal legal parent
status include that there are some individuals who will decline
to take steps to establish formal legal parent status due to fear
or mistrust of the government or a desire to exclude the state
from their home life to the largest extent possible.250 This may
be particularly likely among groups of individuals who have
faced discrimination and mistreatment at the hands of the
government or legal system in the past. Moreover, for anyone
who is not the child’s birth mother or her spouse at the time of
the child’s birth, there likely will always be steps required to
obtain formal legal parent status and there will always be some
parents who are simply unaware of these steps. This will be true
even if the required procedures are efficient and low-cost.
Overall, even if the existing formal avenues to
establishing legal parent status or their equivalent are
expanded to same-sex couples, there will always be individuals
who, for one reason or another, cannot or do not take the steps
required to obtain legal parent status through the available
formal avenues. For some of these families, the reasons for not
pursuing formal legal parent status for the functional parent
will be completely unrelated to the consent of the formal legal
parent, the assumption of the obligations of parenthood by the
functional parent, and the bond between the functional parent
and child. In these situations, equitable parenthood doctrines
play an essential role in protecting the well-being of children and
the important relationships formed between children and their
functional parents. Notably, in a number of cases courts have
used equitable parenthood doctrines to grant rights to a
functional parent who is involved in a different-sex relationship
with the child’s formal legal parent.251 The application of
equitable parenthood doctrines in cases involving different-sex
parents provides forceful support for the notion that there will
be situations in which application of these doctrines is necessary
to protect children and their functional parents even if the
avenues of obtaining formal legal parent status currently
See supra notes 239–240 and accompanying text.
See supra note 204 and accompanying text.
251 See, e.g., Kinnard v. Kinnard, 43 P.3d 150 (Ala. 2002); McAllister v.
McAllister, 779 N.W.2d 652 (N.D. 2010); Michael L. v. Hilary W.-S., No. 947CV2002,
2002 WL 32140628 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Nov. 25, 2002); Middleton v. Johnson, 633 S.E.2d
162 (S.C. Ct. App. 2006); Michaelholt v. Holt, 315 P.3d 470 (Wash. 2013).
249
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available to different-sex couples are expanded to same-sex
couples. Moreover, the decline in marriage among different-sex
couples and rise in births outside of marriage over the past
several decades have increased the number of children who do
not have two formal legal parents and have made it more likely
that a significant number of children being raised within
different-sex relationships will have a functional parent-child
relationship with an individual who has not obtained formal
legal parent status.252 Consequently, abandoning these doctrines
will harm not only families that include same-sex parents, but
also will harm different-sex parents and their children.
Importantly, equitable parenthood doctrines do not seek to
supplant, and have not supplanted, formal avenues to
establishing legal parent status.253 Instead, the equitable
parenthood doctrines simply serve to provide a safety net for
compelling cases involving parents who have, for whatever
reason, fallen through the gaps in the avenues of establishing
formal legal parent status.254
While the availability to functional parents of efficient,
low-cost avenues to establishing formal legal parent status
should not preclude application of equitable parenthood
doctrines, the availability of such avenues may factor into the
application of the doctrines. As discussed above, the vast
majority of equitable parenthood doctrines include as an
element that the formal legal parent consented to or encouraged
the formation of a parent-like relationship between the
functional parent and the child.255 A couple’s failure to obtain
formal legal parent status for the functional parent despite the
availability of low-cost, efficient avenues to obtaining such
status could be something courts weigh in relevant situations in
assessing the consent element of the jurisdiction’s equitable
252 See Jeffery A. Parness, Dangers in De Facto Parenthood, 37 U. ARK. LITTLE
ROCK L. REV. 25, 28 (2014) (“[T]here has been a significant rise in unwed mothers, who at
birth or thereafter, choose to raise their children with new intimate partners or with family
members, like grandparents. These mothers’ children have no fathers listed on their birth
certificates and biological fathers who fail to ever attain parental childcare status.”
(footnotes omitted)); see also Laufer-Ukeles & Blecher-Prigat, supra note 2, at 435.
253 See supra Part II (discussing formal avenues to establishing legal parent status).
254 Ball, supra note 232, at 667–68 (“The application of the doctrine, in other
words, does not prevent courts from using biology, adoption, and the entering into
legally-recognized relationships as means through which to grant parentage status.
Instead, the doctrine serves as an alternative means of acquiring that status, one that
recognizes the diversity of American families at the beginning of the twenty-first century
without jeopardizing the ability of the majority of individuals to be recognized as parents
through the application of bright-line rules.”).
255 Suzanne B. Goldberg, et al., Family Law Scholarship Goes to Court:
Functional Parenthood and the Case of Debra H. v. Janice R., 20 COLUM. J. GENDER &
L. 348, 363 (2011).
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parenthood doctrine.256 In appropriate situations, the failure to
obtain formal legal parent status despite the availability of
efficient, low-cost avenues might also factor into the analysis of
whether the functional parent assumed the obligations of
parenthood, which is another common element of equitable
parenthood doctrines.257 The result may be that the availability
of various low cost, efficient avenues to establishing formal legal
parent status makes it more difficult for functional parents to
obtain relief through equitable parenthood doctrines. This result
is preferable to entirely eliminating equitable parenthood
doctrines. Considering that protecting the best interests of
children is a fundamental goal of family law, the law should not
create a situation where parental rights for an individual who
has functioned as a child’s parent depend entirely on whether
that individual has undertaken the formal steps necessary to
obtain legal parent status.258 To completely abandon the
equitable parenthood doctrines based solely on the grounds that
formal avenues to establishing legal parent status were
available would mean that actually functioning as a parent is
a largely unimportant consideration in determining an
individual’s eligibility for parental rights—a curious approach for
an area of the law that purports to place children’s best interests
at the forefront of its goals.
Finally, while in the coming years same-sex couples will
likely edge closer to different-sex couples with regard to access
to low-cost, efficient avenues to establishing formal legal parent
status, it is unlikely that the ability of same-sex parents to
establish formal legal parent status will ever truly be equal in
all respects to the ability of different-sex parents to establish
formal legal parent status. This is due in significant part to the
law’s longstanding and continued emphasis on biology in

256 This is the approach taken by the ALI, which states that the failure to adopt
should be considered in evaluating whether the parties agreed that the informal parent
would take on a parental role. Deborah L. Forman, Same-Sex Partners: Strangers, Third
Parties, or Parents? The Changing Legal Landscape and the Struggle For Parental
Equality, 40 FAM. L.Q. 23, 46 (2006) (“However, the ALI comments to its section on
‘Parenthood by Estoppel’ provide that failure to adopt, when it is an available option,
relates merely to whether an agreement existed that the partner would assume a
parental role.”).
257 See supra notes 98–99 and accompanying text.
258 Forman, supra note 256, at 46 (“If we look at these cases from the children’s
perspective, it becomes clearer that whether the partner adopted or not, the completion
of a formal adoption seems beside the point, especially if she functioned as a parent and
developed the resulting psychological attachment with the child.”); Ball, supra note 232,
at 660-61 (“It is unlikely that a child under these circumstances will consider [a
functional parent who has not obtained legal parent status] to be any less of a parent—
especially if she served in that capacity for an extended period of time.”).
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determining formal legal parent status.259 Consequently, even if
in the future same-sex couples gain greater access to low-cost,
efficient avenues to establishing formal legal parent status, it is
likely that abandoning equitable parenthood doctrines will still
disproportionately harm same-sex parents and their children.260
Overall, equitable parenthood doctrines will continue to play an
essential role in protecting LGBT parents and their children
regardless of whether same-sex couples gain greater access to
avenues of establishing formal legal parent status. The
promotion of equitable parenthood doctrines should therefore
remain a significant goal of the LGBT rights movement even as
the movement continues to pursue greater access to low-cost,
efficient avenues to establishing formal legal parent status.
B.

The Role of the LGBT Rights Movement in Maintaining
and Promoting Equitable Parenthood Doctrines
1. Clarifying the Goals of the Movement

On a broad scale, the LGBT rights movement is reaching
a point where it must decide if its ultimate relationship
recognition goals simply relate to attaining equal access to
formal relationship statuses or if there is something more that
the movement is seeking. Specifically, the movement needs to
determine whether changing laws relating to marriage,
parentage, and other issues is important beyond just the reform
that creates greater equality in access to the existing formal
relationship statuses. The LGBT rights movement has been
stunningly successful on a number of fronts in obtaining greater
access to formal relationship statuses for LGBT individuals.261
To stop at mere equality of access to existing formal relationship
statuses, however, would be to leave underdeveloped one of the
most impressive accomplishments of the LGBT rights movement
to date: challenging law and society to think differently about
See NeJaime, supra note 132, at 1258–59.
Id. at 1258–59 (“Indeed, in observing that ‘[i]t is the children of same-sex
couples who will be most severely affected by being limited in their opportunity to
maintain bonds with a party who is not a biological parent but who has . . . functionally
behaved as the children’s second parent, the opinion evinced an appreciation for how
resistance to nonbiological parentage in both marital and nonmarital families reflects
and produces LGBT inequality. Importantly, it suggested that, as a constitutional
matter, Obergefell calls such inequality into question.” (omission and alteration in
original) (footnote omitted) (quoting McGaw v. McGaw, 468 S.W.3d 435, 454 (Mo. Ct.
App. 2015))).
261 This is reflected by the nationwide recognition of same-sex marriage as well
as the advancements in access to formal avenues to obtaining legal parent status for
same-sex parents discussed in Section II.A.
259
260
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how family is defined so that important relationships, regardless
of their form, are supported and protected.
In terms of the more narrow issue of the LGBT rights
movement’s goals with regard to parental rights, the movement
has been a major force in furthering legal developments that
provide parental rights to nonbiological parents raising children
within same-sex relationships. One of the most consequential
ways it has done this is through the promotion of equitable
parenthood doctrines—the LGBT rights movement has played
an essential role in advancing these doctrines in jurisdictions
throughout the United States.262 Recently, however, much of the
movement’s focus has shifted to advocating for the expansion to
same-sex couples of existing avenues to obtaining formal legal
parent status. There is no doubt that some of this shift stems
from the achievement of marriage equality, which opened the
door to the application of marriage-based avenues to
establishing formal legal parent status to same-sex couples.263
The movement must now decide whether the promotion of
equitable parenthood doctrines will remain a significant part of
its focus, or whether instead it will focus more exclusively on
obtaining greater access to formal avenues to obtaining legal
parent status. In answering this question, the movement should
identify and examine any worthy goals furthered by equitable
parenthood doctrines and assess whether these goals would be
furthered as effectively through increased access for same-sex
couples to avenues of establishing formal legal parent status.
This will allow the movement to determine whether the
promotion of equitable parenthood remains an important and
worthy endeavor even as the movement pursues increased
access to avenues of establishing formal legal parent status.
One possibility is that the sole worthy goal furthered by
equitable parenthood doctrines relates to protecting the rights
and interests of individuals in same-sex relationships who have
functioned as parents but lack biological ties to their children. If
this were the case, one may argue that because the need for
equitable parenthood doctrines stemmed from the historical
exclusion of nonbiological parents raising children within samesex relationships from avenues of establishing formal legal
parent status, the recent success the movement has had in
expanding access to avenues to establishing formal legal parent
status for such parents renders equitable parenthood doctrines

262
263

See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
See Polikoff, supra note 189, at 721–23.
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unnecessary.264 Even if the sole worthy goal furthered by
equitable parenthood doctrines related to protecting the
interests of nonbiological parents in same-sex relationships,
these doctrines would continue to be necessary to promote this
goal regardless of the expansion to same-sex couples of formal
avenues to establishing legal parent status. As discussed above,
there have been, and there will continue to be, nonbiological
parents raising children in same-sex relationships who are
unable to use the available formal avenues to establish legal
parent status despite increases in access to such avenues for
same-sex couples.265 Consequently, the existence of equitable
parenthood doctrines is essential to protecting the rights and
interests of these nonbiological parents raising children in samesex relationships despite increased availability to same-sex
couples of formal avenues to establishing legal parent status.266
Protecting the rights of nonbiological parents in same-sex
relationships, however, is far from the only important goal
furthered by equitable parenthood doctrines. The LGBT rights
movement must be careful not to overlook what it has long
identified as a core purpose of equitable parenthood doctrines:
furthering the well-being of children by protecting the
relationships formed between children and the individuals in
their lives who have functioned as their parents.267 The
arguments set forth by leading LGBT rights organizations,
scholars, and attorneys over the last several decades in support of
the adoption and application of equitable parenthood doctrines
have stressed the idea that these doctrines are essential because
research indicates children can suffer great harm when their
relationship with a parental figure is disrupted, regardless of
whether that parental figure is a formal legal parent.268 To
abandon the promotion of these doctrines as a result of the
expansion to same-sex couples of avenues to establishing formal
legal parent status would be to ignore the arguments made over
the years by leading LGBT rights advocates and to render those
arguments seemingly disingenuous.
See supra Section II.A.
See supra Section IV.A.
266 See supra Section IV.A.
267 See supra note 30 (compiling briefs submitted by leading LGBT rights
organizations arguing in favor of the application of equitable parenthood doctrines).
268 See, e.g., Amici Curiae Brief of Nat’l Ctr. for Lesbian Rights et al., supra note
30 (“[T]here is a compelling interest in protecting the child from the ‘emotional
harm . . . intrinsic in the termination or significant curtailment of the child’s relationship
with a psychological parent under any definition of that term.’” (omission in original)
(quoting In re E.L.M.C., 100 P.3d 546, 561 (Colo. App. 2004))); see also supra notes 60–71
and accompanying text.
264
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More importantly, since it is inevitable that, despite the
expansion to same-sex couples of formal avenues to establishing
legal parent status, situations will continue to arise in which
individuals who have formed parent-like bonds with their
children could not or did not take the steps necessary to
establish formal legal parent status, equitable parenthood
doctrines will remain essential in protecting the well-being and
best interests of children.269 Moreover, due to the law’s historical
reliance on biology in determining legal parent status and the
continuing discrimination against same-sex parents with regard
to access to formal avenues of establishing legal parent status,
it likely will long remain the case that the equitable parenthood
doctrines will most frequently serve to protect children within
LGBT families.270 Overall, if protecting the well-being of
children, especially children being raised by same-sex parents,
is a goal that the LGBT rights movement wishes to continue to
promote, the advancement of equitable parenthood doctrines
should remain a focus of the movement, regardless of how
successful it is in obtaining greater access to formal avenues of
establishing legal parent status.
2. Advocating for Increased Access for Same-Sex
Couples to Formal Avenues of Establishing Legal
Parent Status Without Leaving Functional
Parents Behind
While the LGBT rights movement should continue to
promote equitable parenthood doctrines, it should also continue
to advocate for the expansion to same-sex parents of formal
avenues to establishing legal parent status. Obtaining formal
legal parent status is important for parents as well as their
children for a number of reasons. Even in states that have
adopted equitable parenthood doctrines, most do not treat
equitable parents as equal to legal parents for purposes of
custody and visitation.271 In addition, while a wide variety of
See supra Section IV.A.
See supra note 259 and accompanying text.
271 Feinberg, supra note 1, at 353–54 (discussing the approach of a number of
jurisdictions in which equitable parents are treated as inferior to legal parents in
determining custody and visitation rights); Laufer-Ukeles & Blecher-Prigat, supra note
2, at 449 (“Thus, although the V.C. court initially equated functional and formal
parenthood and indicated that once functional parenthood is assigned that person is a
parent for all intents and purposes, it later said there should be a presumptive rule that
functional parents (as opposed to formal parents) will receive visitation as opposed to
full custody. In fact, courts applying functional parenthood have in practice followed this
presumption despite conceptually equalizing parenthood.”).
269
270
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legal rights and obligations attach to formal legal parent-child
relationships, “[i]t remains unclear in many states whether
equitable parents have [any] rights or obligations outside the
context of child custody and visitation.”272 Moreover, application
of equitable parenthood doctrines is complicated and intrusive
for the parties and their children, and relying on these doctrines
to secure parental rights is a risky endeavor. Having the parent
in question identified as early as possible as a legal parent with
all of the attendant rights and obligations is undoubtedly in the
best interests of the children involved.273
Expanding formal avenues of establishing legal parent
status to same-sex parents, while important, will only be
effective if same-sex parents actually take advantage of such
avenues. Unfortunately, some parents underestimate the
importance of obtaining legal parent status or mistakenly believe
that functioning as a parent will be enough to result in legal
protection of their relationship with the child. Consequently,
conveying the idea that obtaining legal parent status is of vital
importance in securing parental rights should be a key goal of the
LGBT rights movement and the movement should educate samesex parents regarding the steps necessary to establish formal
legal parent status, encourage them to take such steps, and assist
them in doing so. However, the movement’s message with regard
to establishing formal legal parent status needs to be set forth in
a way that, while effectively and forcefully highlighting the
importance of obtaining formal legal parent status, does not
denigrate functional parents.
Specifically, the message should stress that while
functional parents are as important to their children’s lives as
formal parents and deserve equal respect, the reality is that the
law places great weight on the establishment of formal legal
parent status. The message should convey that establishing
formal legal parent status provides rights and protections that
are essential not only to functional parents, but also to their
children, and that failure to obtain formal legal parent status
can result in both children and their functional parents being
unjustly denied many of these important rights and protections.
272 Joslin, supra note 27, at 502–03 (“For example, a child may not be entitled
to children’s Social Security benefits through her functional but nonlegal parent. The
child may also not be entitled to child support through her functional but nonlegal
parent. Additionally, a de facto parent may not have standing to oppose an adoption by
a third person.” (footnotes omitted)).
273 Aviel, supra note 33, at 2065–66 (“Professor Elizabeth Bartholet has
similarly argued that children do better when parental authority is concentrated in two
clearly identified parents who enjoy that status from the time of the child’s birth.”); see
also Laufer-Ukeles & Blecher-Prigat, supra note 2, at 464–65.
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Moreover, because many people prefer not to plan for or consider
the potential demise of their romantic relationships, the
message should stress that the rights and protections
accompanying formal legal parent-child relationships are
important for children and parents within both intact and nonintact families.274 Overall, the message should celebrate
functional parents while simultaneously encouraging them to
become formal parents by stressing that it is the fact that
functional parents are so important to the lives of their children
that makes it essential that they take the steps necessary for
them to obtain formal legal parent status.
Finally, it is important to understand that no amount of
messaging from the movement regarding the importance of
obtaining formal legal parent status will be enough to help
same-sex parents who lack the resources to pursue the available
avenues of establishing formal legal parent status. It is therefore
essential that the movement commit to providing assistance to
same-sex parents in obtaining formal legal parent status.
Equally essential, however, is that the movement recognize that
it is inevitable that there will be functional parents who could
not or did not obtain formal legal parent status and, as a result
of this recognition, continue to advocate forcefully for the
adoption and application of equitable parenthood doctrines. It is
this that is the most important action the movement can take to
avoid denigrating functional parents while it continues to
pursue increased access to avenues of establishing formal legal
parent status.
CONCLUSION
As same-sex parents gain increasing access to formal
avenues of establishing legal parent status, the future of
equitable parenthood doctrines is uncertain. It will be tempting
for courts and legislatures to abandon equitable parenthood
doctrines in favor of exclusive reliance on formal avenues to
establishing legal parent status. This is in part because the
relatively straightforward, bright-line approach to establishing
legal parent status that inheres in the formal avenues allows
courts to make parentage determinations more efficiently and
without having to undertake any significant inquiry into the
274 For example, whether within the context of intact or non-intact families,
children may not be able to claim Social Security benefits based upon a functional parentchild relationship, and a de facto parent may not have the right to make medical or
educational decisions for the child. Joslin, supra note 27, at 502; JOSLIN ET AL., supra
note 74, § 7:1.
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dynamics of the relationships between the parties or the child
and party seeking parental rights. In contrast, application of
equitable parenthood doctrines requires courts to examine very
closely facts relating to the dynamics of the relationships at
issue and to undertake complicated analyses regarding the
consent of the formal legal parent, the assumption of the
obligations of parenthood by the functional parent, and the bond
between the functional parent and child. In addition, due to the
fact that it was, in significant part, the historical denial to samesex parents of avenues to establishing formal parent status that
led many courts and legislatures to adopt equitable parenthood
doctrines, these entities may now conclude that the increasing
expansion to same-sex parents of formal avenues to establishing
legal parent status renders such doctrines unnecessary.
To abandon equitable parenthood doctrines, however,
would be a mistake. As an initial matter, the current formal
avenues available to same-sex couples for establishing legal
parent status are based primarily upon marriage and adoption.
Couples may be unable or unwilling to pursue marriage- and
adoption-based avenues to establishing formal legal parent
status for a wide variety of reasons, and the failure to pursue
these avenues may indicate nothing about the functional
parent’s relationship with the child or the understanding
between the functional parent and the formal legal parent
regarding that relationship. In addition, excluding equitable
parenthood doctrines due to the availability of marriage- or
adoption-based avenues for establishing formal legal parent
status would disproportionately harm same-sex couples and
their children—unlike same-sex couples, different-sex couples
have access to a variety of formal avenues to establishing legal
parent status that require neither marriage nor adoption.
Moreover, equitable parenthood doctrines should not be
abandoned even if most of the existing formal avenues of
establishing legal parent status or their equivalent are
expanded to same-sex couples. There will always be parents
who, for whatever reason, are unable or unwilling to take the
formal steps necessary to establish legal parent status, and a
legal approach that categorically refuses to provide rights to
functional parents is an approach to parental rights that fails to
promote children’s best interests.
For family law to most effectively advance what is
perhaps its most essential goal, protecting the best interests of
children, it must continue to adopt and apply equitable
parenthood doctrines even as formal avenues to establishing
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legal parent status increasingly are expanded to same-sex
couples. Research demonstrates conclusively that children form
strong bonds with parental figures regardless of the existence of
biological or adoptive ties.275 The disruption of the relationships
between functional parents and their children can lead to
significantly harmful short- and long-term effects for the children
involved.276 As a result, it is essential to maintain equitable
parenthood doctrines so that in appropriate cases, the doctrines
can be used to protect the well-being of children who have formed
a parent-child relationship with a parental figure who has not
established formal legal parent status. Moreover, in order to most
effectively protect LGBT families, the LGBT rights movement,
which has long played a key role in promoting the adoption and
application of equitable parenthood doctrines, should continue to
advocate for these doctrines even as it pursues the equally
important goal of increasing access for same-sex couples to formal
avenues of establishing legal parent status.
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See supra notes 53–71, 233 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 53–71 and accompanying text.

